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Abstract
We document that the U.S. and other G7 economies have been characterized by an in-
creasingly negative business cycle asymmetry over the last three decades. This nding can
be explained by the concurrent increase in the nancial leverage of households and rms.
To support this view, we devise and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model with
collateralized borrowing and occasionally binding credit constraints. Improved access to
credit increases the likelihood that nancial constraints become non-binding in the face of
expansionary shocks, allowing agents to freely substitute intertemporally. Contractionary
shocks, on the other hand, are further amplied by drops in collateral values, since con-
straints remain binding. As a result, booms become progressively smoother and more
prolonged than busts. Finally, in line with recent empirical evidence, nancially-driven
expansions lead to deeper contractions, as compared with equally-sized non-nancial ex-
pansions.
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1 Introduction
Economic uctuations across the industrialized world are typically characterized by asymme-
tries in the shape of expansions and contractions in aggregate activity. A prolic literature
has extensively studied the statistical properties of this empirical regularity, reporting that
the magnitude of contractions tends to be larger than that of expansions; see, among others,
Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989), Sichel (1993) and, more recently, Morley and Piger (2012) and
Adrian et al. (2018). While these studies have generally indicated that business uctuations
are negatively skewed, the possibility that business cycle asymmetry has changed over time has
been overlooked. Yet, the shape of the business cycle has evolved over the last three decades:
For instance, since the mid-1980s the U.S. economy has displayed a marked decline in macro-
economic volatility, a phenomenon known as the Great Moderation (Kim and Nelson, 1999;
McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). This paper documents that, over the same period, the
skewness of the U.S. business cycle has become increasingly negative. Our key contribution is
to show that occasionally binding nancial constraints, combined with a sustained increase in
nancial leverage, allow us to account for several facts associated with the evolution of business
cycle asymmetry.
Figure 1 reports the post-WWII rate of growth of U.S. real GDP, together with the 68%
and 90% condence intervals from a Gaussian density tted on pre- and post-1984 data. Three
facts stand out: First, as discussed above, the U.S. business cycle has become less volatile in
the second part of the sample, even if we take into account the major turmoil induced by the
Great Recession. Second, real GDP growth displays large swings in both directions during the
rst part of the sample, while in the post-1984 period the large downswings associated with the
three recessionary episodes are not matched by similar-sized upswings. In fact, if we examine
the size of economic contractions in conjunction with the drop in volatility occurring since the
mid-1980s, it appears that recessions have become relatively more violent, whereas the ensuing
recoveries have become smoother, as recently pointed out by Fatás and Mihov (2013). Finally,
recessionary episodes have become less frequent, thus implying more prolonged expansions.
[Insert Figure 1]
These properties, which are shared by all the G7 economies, translate into business cycles
displaying increasingly negative asymmetry over the last three decades. Explaining this pattern
represents a challenge for existing business cycle models. To meet this, a theory is needed that
involves both non-linearities and a secular development of the underlying mechanism, so as to
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shape the evolution in business cycle skewness. As for the rst prerequisite, the importance of
borrowing constraints as a source of business cycle asymmetries has long been recognized in
the literature; see, e.g., the survey by Brunnermeier et al. (2013). In expansions, households
and rms may nd it optimal to borrow less than their available credit limit. Instead, nancial
constraints tend to be binding during recessions, so that borrowing is tied to the value of
collateral assets. The resulting non-linearity translates into a negatively skewed business cycle.
As for the second prerequisite, the past decades have witnessed a major deregulation of nancial
markets, with one result being a substantial increase in the degree of leverage of advanced
economies. To see this, Figure 2 reports the credit-to-GDP and the loan-to-asset (LTA) ratios of
both households and the corporate sector in the US.1 This leveraging process is also conrmed,
e.g., by Jordà et al. (2017) in a large cross-section of countries.
[Insert Figure 2]
Based on these insights, the objective of this paper is to propose a structural explanation
of deepening business cycle asymmetry. To this end, we devise and estimate a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that allows for the collateral constraints faced by
the rms and a fraction of the households not to bind at all points in time. We examine
the model in the presence of a realistic increase in the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
facing both households and rms. Due to easier access to credit, the likelihood that collateral
constraints become non-binding increases when expansionary shocks hit. The magnitude of
the resulting boom is therefore attenuated as agents can freely smooth their actions over time.
The model predicts this is typically the case for corporate borrowing. By contrast, nancially
constrained households never nd themselves unconstrained, primarily because their debt con-
tracts are mostly long-term, so that shocks tend to a¤ect a relatively small part of the stock
of debt being renanced in each period.2 In the face of contractionary shocks, instead, both
types of borrowers tend to remain nancially constrained. In light of these e¤ects, business
cycles become increasingly negatively skewed. Following an increase in household and corpo-
rate leverage, as observed in the post-1984 sample, the model accounts for up to 50% of the
asymmetry in the growth of real GDP, as measured by both the skewness and the ratio between
1As we discuss in Appendix A, the aggregate LTA ratios reported in Figure 2 are likely to understate the
actual loan-to-value (LTV) requirements faced by the marginal borrower. While alternative measures may yield
higher LTV ratios, they point to the same behavior of leverage over time (see also Graham et al., 2014, and
Jordà et al., 2017).
2On the other hand, the presence of long-term household borrowing proves to be important to reproduce
other key features of changing business cycle asymmetry. Primarily, the substantial increase in the duration of
expansions that has been observed since the mid-1980s.
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the downside and the upside semivolatility of GDP growth. The model also predicts that the
average duration of contractions does not change much as leverage increases, whereas that of
expansions increases substantially in the post-1984 sample, closely in line with the changes
observed in the data.
We then juxtapose the deepening in business cycle asymmetry with the Great Modera-
tion in macroeconomic volatility. While increasing leverage cannot in itself account for the
Great Moderation, our analysis shows that the deepening asymmetry of the business cycle is
compatible with a drop in its volatility. Additionally, the decline in macroeconomic volatility
mostly rests on the characteristics of the expansions, whose magnitude declines as an e¤ect
of collateral constraints becoming increasingly lax. This is in line with the empirical ndings
of Gadea-Rivas et al. (2014, 2015), who show that neither changes to the depth nor to the
frequency of recessionary episodes account for the stabilization of macroeconomic activity in
the US.3
Recently, increasing attention has been devoted to the connection between the driving fac-
tors behind business cycle expansions and the extent of the subsequent contractions. Jordà et al.
(2013) report that more credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions
irrespective of whether the latter are accompanied by a nancial crisis. Our model accounts
for this feature along two dimensions. First, we show that contractions become increasingly
deeper as the average LTV ratio increases, even though the boom-bust cycle is generated by
the same combination of expansionary and contractionary shocks. Second, nancially-driven
expansions lead to deeper contractions, when compared to similar-sized expansions generated
by non-nancial shocks. Both exercises emphasize that, following a contractionary shock, the
aggregate repercussions of nancially constrained agentsdeleveraging increases in the size of
their debt. As a result, increasing leverage makes it harder for savers to compensate for the
drop in consumption and investment of constrained agents. This narrative of the boom-bust
cycle characterized by a debt overhang is consistent with the results of Mian and Su (2010),
who identify a close connection at the county level in the US between pre-crisis growth of
household leverage and the severity of the Great Recession. Likewise, Giroud and Mueller
(2017) document that, over the same period, counties with highly leveraged rms su¤ered
larger employment losses.
3In this respect, downward wage rigidity has recently been pointed to as an alternative source of macroeco-
nomic asymmetry (see Abbritti and Fahr, 2013). However, for this to act as a driver of deepening business cycle
asymmetry, one would need to observe stronger rigidity over time. Most importantly, even if such a mechanism
was at work, the resulting change in the skewness of the business cycle would primarily rest on the emergence
of more dramatic recessionary episodes, without any major change in the key characteristics of expansions.
However, this implication would stand in contrast with the evidence of Gadea-Rivas et al. (2014, 2015).
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Our analysis stresses the functioning of occasionally binding nancial constraints in combi-
nation with a sustained increase in nancial leverage. This is consistent with existing accounts
of the widespread nancial liberalization that started in the US during the 1980s, which provide
evidence of a relaxation of nancial constraints over time (see, e.g., Justiniano and Primiceri,
2008). For households, Dynan et al. (2006) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) have dis-
cussed how the wave of nancial deregulation taking place in the early 1980s paved the way for
a substantial reduction in downpayment requirements and the rise of the subprime mortgage
market. Combined with the boom in securitization some years later, this profoundly trans-
formed household credit markets and gave rise to the leveraging process observed in Figure 2.
As for the corporate sector, the period since around 1980 has witnessed the emergence of a
market for high-risk, high-yield bonds (Gertler and Lown, 1999) along with enhanced access
to both equity markets and bank credit for especially small- and medium-sized rms (Jermann
and Quadrini, 2009). Over the same period the investment-cash ow sensitivity in the US has
declined substantially, a fact interpreted by several authors as an alleviation of rmsnancial
frictions (see, e.g., Agca and Mozumdar, 2008, and Brown and Petersen, 2009).4 Our ndings
point to these developments as an impetus of the deepening asymmetry of the U.S. business
cycle observed during the same period.
The observation that occasionally binding credit constraints may give rise to macroeco-
nomic asymmetries is not new. Mendoza (2010) explores this idea in the context of a small
open economy facing a constraint on its access to foreign credit. As this constraint becomes
binding, the economy enters a sudden stopepisode characterized by a sharp decline in con-
sumption. Ma¤ezzoli and Monacelli (2015) show that the aggregate implications of nancial
shocks are state-dependent, with the economys response being greatly amplied in situations
where agents switch from being nancially unconstrained to being constrained. In a similar
spirit, Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) report that house prices exerted a much larger e¤ect on
private consumption during the Great Recession when credit constraints became binding
than in the preceding expansion. While all these studies focus on specic economic disturbances
and/or historical episodes, a key insight of this paper is to show how di¤erent evolving traits of
business cycle asymmetry may be accounted for by a secular process of nancial liberalization,
conditional on both nancial and non-nancial disturbances.
We document a strong connection between leverage and business cycle asymmetry across
the G7 countries. This result is related to the ndings of Jordà et al. (2017), who report a
4Specically, Brown and Petersen (2009) show that the investment-cash ow sensitivity declined from around
0:3  0:4 in the 1970-1981 period to around 0:1  0:2 in the post-1982 period.
4
positive correlation between the skewness of real GDP growth and the credit-to-GDP ratio
for a large cross-section of countries observed over a long time-span. Popov (2014) exclusively
focuses on business cycle asymmetry in a large panel of developed and developing countries,
documenting two main results. First, the average business cycle skewness across all coun-
tries became markedly negative after 1991, consistent with our ndings for the US. Second,
this pattern is particularly distinct in countries that liberalized their nancial markets. Also
Bekaert and Popov (2015) examine a large cross-section of countries, reporting that more -
nancially developed economies have more negatively skewed business cycles. Finally, Rancière
et al. (2008) establish a negative cross-country relationship between real GDP growth and the
skewness of credit growth in nancially liberalized countries. While we focus on the asymmetry
of output, we observe a similar pattern for credit, making our results comparable with their
ndings. On a more general note, all of these studies focus on the connection between business
cycle skewness and nancial factors in the cross-country dimension, whereas we examine how
nancial leverage may have shaped various dimensions of business cycle asymmetry over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we report a host of evidence
on the connection between leverage and changes in the shape of the business cycle. Section 3
inspects the key mechanisms at play in our narrative within a simple two-period model. Section
4 presents our DSGE model, and Section 5 discusses its solution and estimation. Section 6
reports the quantitative results based on the DSGE model. Section 7 shows that the model
is capable of producing the type of debt-overhang recession emphasized in recent empirical
studies. Section 8 concludes. The appendices contain supplementary material concerning the
model solution and various empirical and computational details.
2 Empirical evidence
We rst examine various aspects of business cycle asymmetry in the US, and how they have
changed over the last three decades. We then enlarge our view to other G7 countries, and
investigate how changes in business cycle asymmetry connect to the role of leverage. Finally,
we take advantage of cross-sectional variation across U.S. States to document an empirical
relationship between household leverage and the deepness of state-level contractions during
the Great Recession.
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2.1 Changing business cycle asymmetry
A number of empirical studies have documented a major reduction in the volatility of the U.S.
business cycle since the mid-1980s. In this section we document changes in the asymmetry of
the cycle that have occurred over the same time span. Table 1 reports the skewness of the rate
of growth of di¤erent macroeconomic aggregates in the pre- and post-1984 period.
[Insert Table 1]
The skewness is typically negative and not too distant from zero in the rst part of the
sample, but becomes more negative thereafter.5 To supplement this nding, we employ a
battery of normality tests, which all reject normality in the second subsample, regardless of how
the growth rate of real GDP is computed. For instance, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
with estimated parameters (see Lilliefors, 1967), with the null hypothesis being that (year-on-
year) GDP growth data in either of the two periods are drawn from a Normal distribution: This
is strongly rejected for the second subsample (p-value=0:004), whereas it cannot be rejected
in the rst one (p-value=0:289).6
[Insert Table 2]
Another way to highlight changes in the shape of the business cycle is to compare the upside
and the downside semivolatilities of real GDP growth over the two subsamples. The upside
(downside) semivolatility is obtained as the average of the squared deviation from the mean
of observations that are above (below) the mean. The overall volatility of the business cycle
during the Great Moderation has dropped by more than 40%, compared to the pre-moderation
period (from 3:07% to 1:75%, when calculated on year-on-year GDP growth). However, as
indicated in Table 2, this drop has not been symmetric. In fact, whereas the upside and
downside semivolatilities are roughly equal in the pre-moderation sample, in the post-1984
sample the (square root of the) downside semivolatility is around 35% larger than its upside
5Appendix B1 reports measures of time-varying volatility and skewness of real GDP growth, based on a
non-parametric estimator. The downward pattern in business cycle asymmetry emerges as a robust feature of
the data, along with the widely documented decline in macroeconomic volatility.
6Additional normality tests are reported in Appendix B2. We also check that the drop in the skewness does
not result from a moderate asymmetry in the rst part of the sample being magnied by a fall in the volatility,
such as the Great Moderation. The skewness of a random variable is dened as m3/3, where m3 is the third
central moment of the distribution and  denotes its standard deviation: Therefore, an increase in the absolute
size of the skewness could merely reect a fall in , with m3 remaining close to invariant. However, this is not
the case, as m3 =  2:817 for the year-on-year growth rate of real GDP in the pre-1984 sample, while it equals
 6:875 afterwards.
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counterpart, when calculated on year-on-year GDP growth.7 As highlighted in Figure 1, this
implies an increase in the smoothness of the expansions, indicating that the emergence of the
Great Moderation mostly rests on the characteristics of the upsides of the cycle, as recently
argued by Gadea-Rivas et al. (2014, 2015). All in all, our evidence suggests that the U.S.
business cycle has become more asymmetric in the last three decades.
The next step in the analysis consists of translating changes in the business cycle asymmetry
into some explicit measure of the deepness of economic contractions, while accounting for time-
variation in the dispersion of the growth rate process. In line with Jordà et al. (2017), the
rst column of Table 3 reports the fall of real GDP during a given recession, divided by the
duration of the recession itself: this measure is labelled as violence.8
[Insert Table 3]
Comparing the violence of the contractionary episodes before and after 1984, we notice that
the 1991 and 2001 recessions have not been very di¤erent from earlier contractions. However, to
compare the relative magnitude of di¤erent recessions over a period that displays major changes
in the volatility of the business cycle, it is appropriate to control for the average variability of
the cycle around a given recessionary episode. To this end, the second column of Table 3 reports
standardized violence, which is obtained by normalizing violence by a measure of the variability
of real GDP growth.9 Using this metric we get a rather di¤erent picture. The three recessionary
episodes occurred during the Great Moderation appear substantially deeper than the pre-1984
ones: averaging out the rst seven recessionary episodes returns a standardized violence of
1:22%, against an average of 2:90% for the post-1984 period. Moreover, as highlighted in
the last two columns of Table 3, the duration of business cycle contractions does not change
much between the two samples, while the duration of the expansions doubles. This contributes
to picturing the business cycle in the post-1984 sample as consisting of more smoothed and
prolonged expansions, interrupted by short yet, more dramatic contractionary episodes.
7It is worth highlighting that the major drop in business cycle asymmetry does not uniquely depend on
the Great Recession. If one looks at the asymmetry of real GDP growth over the 1984:III-2007:II sample, a
sizable drop in the skewness can still be appreciated (from  0:09 to  0:70 for year-on-year growth, and from
 0:11 to  0:39 for quarter-on-quarter growth). In addition, the ratio between the downside and the upside
semivolatility of GDP growth goes from 1:06 to 1:24 in the case of year-on-year growth rates, and from 1:03 to
1:09 for quarter-on-quarter growth.
8For earlier analyses on the violence (and brevity) of economic contractions see Mitchell (1927) and, more
recently, McKay and Reis (2008).
9The volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the year-on-year growth rate of real GDP over a
5-year window. We exclude the period running up to the recession by calculating the standard deviation up to
a year before the recession begins. Weighting violence by various alternative mesures of business cycle volatility
returns a qualitatively similar picture: Appendix B3 reports additional robustness evidence on the standardized
violence of the recessions in the US.
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2.2 International evidence
This subsection brings further evidence on evolving asymmetries in the business cycle and
connects this phenomenon to the role of leverage. To this end, we enlarge our view to the G7
countries, and investigate changes in the asymmetry of business uctuations, and how they
connect to the degree of leverage.
Table 4 reports the skewness and the ratio between the downside and the upside semivolatil-
ity of real GDP growth.10 We use data over the 1961:II to 2016:II time window, and split the
sample in the second quarter of 1984.11 For all countries, we detect a more negative skewness,
along with a relative increase in the downside semivolatility during the post-1984 sample, which
implies that the volatility of expansions has declined relative to that of contractions.
[Insert Table 4]
The results so far highlight a more pronounced business cycle asymmetry in the post-1984
sample, both for the US and the remaining G7 countries. This period is also associated with
an increase in leverage on a global scale, the so-called nancial hockey stickhighlighted by
Schularick and Taylor (2012). To gauge the connection between business cycle asymmetry and
leverage, we follow Jordà et al. (2017), and summarize the correlation between some asym-
metry statistics namely, the skewness and the ratio between the downside and the upside
semivolatility of real GDP growth and the loan-to-GDP ratio. To this end, we take quarterly
GDP growth rates for all the countries under investigation (yit), and construct 8-year rolling
windows of data. Thus, we compute country-window specic moments, m (yit), and relate
them to the average credit-to-GDP ratio calculated over the same sample.12 Figure 3 reports
binned scattered diagrams to summarize our results. The regression line is obtained by as-
suming a quadratic relationship between business cycle asymmetry and the loan-to-asset ratio
(including country-level xed e¤ects). The evidence points to a close link between leverage and
business cycle asymmetries: skewness decreases in leverage and, coherently, the magnitude of
10To calculate asymmetry statistics for these countries, we remove the underlying long-run growth appro-
priately, as the country-specic growth rates display large changes over the sample under investigation (see
Antolin-Diaz et al., 2017). This phenomenon is less evident for the US, though the results reported in Table
1 are robust to subtracting the underlying long-run growth rate. We estimate long-run growth as the rst
di¤erence in the smooth trend of the real GDP series. The latter is retrieved through the modied HP lter of
Rotemberg (1999). Using alternative lters delivers similar results.
11Stock and Watson (2005) have shown that, for these countries, the mid-1980s are associated with a sharp
reduction in macroeconomic volatility. The results are robust to delaying the cut-o¤ date.
12For the loan-to-GDP ratio we use the annual data provided by Jordà et al. (2017). In Appendix B4
we reproduce the same charts focusing on the loan-to-GDP ratio for the household and the corporate sector,
respectively, conrming the results reported here for the aggregate. Using a short window to compute moments
implicitly takes care of low-frequency variation in GDP growth. The results obtained by removing the trend in
GDP growth (available upon request) are virtually unchanged.
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the contractionary phases relative to that of the expansionary ones rises as countries display
greater loan-to-GDP ratios.
[Insert Figure 3]
2.3 Leverage and the Great Recession: cross-state evidence
So far we have established that the post-1984 period is characterized by a smoother path of
the expansionary periods and a stronger standardized violence of the recessionary episodes, as
compared with the pre-1984 period. In addition, over the same time window the process of
nancial deregulation has been associated with a sizeable increase in leverage of households and
rms, both in the US and other G7 countries. We now produce related evidence based on U.S.
state-level data. Specically, we take data on quarterly real Gross State Product (GSP) from
the BEA Regional Economic Accounts and compute both the skewness of GSP growth and the
violence of the Great Recession in the U.S. States.13 Figure 4 correlates the resulting statistics
to the average debt-to-income ratio prior to the recession. Notably, states where households
were more leveraged not only have witnessed more severe GSP contractions during the last
recession, but have also displayed a more negatively skewed GSP growth over the 2005-2016
time window.
[Insert Figure 4]
To gain further insights into the cross-sectional connection between the magnitude of the
Great Recession and business cycle dynamics, we order the U.S. states according to households
average pre-crisis debt-to-income ratio. We then construct two synthetic series, computed as the
growth rates of the median real GSP of the top and the bottom ten states in terms of leverage,
respectively. According to Figure 5, there are no noticeable di¤erences in the performance of
the two groups before and after the Great Recession, with both of them growing at a roughly
similar pace. However, the drop in real activity has been much deeper for relatively more
leveraged states. Altogether, this evidence points to a close link between leverage and business
cycle asymmetries.
[Insert Figure 5]
13To account for the possibility that the recession does not begin/end in the same period across the US, we
dene the start of the recession in a given state as the period with the highest level of real GSP in the window
that goes from ve quarters before the NBER peak date to one quarter after that. Similarly, the end of the
recession is calculated as the period with the lowest real GSP in the window from one quarter before to ve
quarters after the NBER trough date.
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3 A two-period model
Some preliminary insights about our main model can be o¤ered through a simple model of
collateralized debt. The model shares many of the central aspects of our DSGE economy, most
notably entrepreneurs facing an asset-based credit constraint. The representative entrepreneur
has utility U = logC1 + E1 logC2, where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and Ct denotes the
consumption of a non-durable good at time t = 1; 2. In both periods, production is carried out
by a representative rm employing capital, Kt 1, and labor, Lt, as production inputs:
Yt = AtK

t 1L
1 
t ; (1)
where A1 is an exogenous stochastic variable with cumulative distribution function F (with
F 0 > 0), and  2 [0; 1]. As we will focus on the e¤ects of technology shocks taking place in
the rst period, A2 is set to a constant, A. We assume that entrepreneurs work as executives
in the rms, and inelastically supply labor, Lt = 1, for t = 1; 2. The entrepreneursdynamic
budget constraints in periods 1 and 2 are, respectively,
C1 + I1  B1 = rK1 K0 +W1  RB0; (2)
C2 =
 
1 + rK2

K1 +W2  RB1; (3)
with K0 > 0 and B0 given,
where Wt denotes the real labour income and rKt is the capital rental rate, for t = 1; 2, and
R > 1 is the gross interest rate. The initial stock of debt is denoted by B0. According to
conventional arguments, we rule out debt in the second period, so that B2 = 0. Investment is
performed in period 1 only:
I1 = K1   (1  )K0; (4)
where  2 [0; 1] is the depreciation rate. Finally, the stock of debt in period 1 cannot exceed a
fraction of the present value of capital:
B1  sK1
R
; s 2 (0; 1) ; (5)
where s is the LTV ratio.
Appendix C shows in detail the derivation of the models competitive equilibrium. Here, it
su¢ ces to consider the capital stock, and thus investment, in period 1. When the constraint
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(5) does not bind, we obtain
K1 =

A
R  1
 1
1 
: (6)
If (5) binds, instead, the solution for K1 is characterized by
	 (K1;A1) = 0; (7)
where
	 (K1;A1)  
 
1 + AK 11   s
 h
A1K

0  RB0  

1  s
R

K1 + (1  )K0
i
  [(1  s)K1 + AK1 ]

1  s
R

: (8)
Di¤erentiating 	 (K1;A1) with respect to K1 shows that
@	 (K1;A1)
@K1
< 0: (9)
Furthermore:
lim
K1!0
	 (K1;A1) = 1; (10)
lim
K1!
	 (K1;A1) =  (1  s)  + A

R  s R; (11)
where   R [A1K0  RB0 + (1  )K0] = (R  s). K1 !  from below corresponds to mov-
ing towards zero period-1 consumption. Hence, as 	 (K1;A1) is a continuously decreasing
function which tends to innity for K1 ! 0, and moves downward towards a nite negative
number as K1 !  a solution for K1 2 R+ exists and is unique.
Crucially, in the face of an expansionary shock, 	 (K1;A1) moves up, for any K1. Hence,
when the credit constraint binds, investment responds to temporary shocks, which it does not
in the unconstrained case, as implied by (6). In light of this, a negative shock will have adverse
investment repercussions, while a similar-sized positive shock may have no impact at all, if
it makes the entrepreneur unconstrained. This type of discontinuity which extends to the
behavior of production and consumption is at the heart of negative asymmetry in the model.
To rene our analysis, it is useful to denote with A1 the value of the technology shock that
makes investment the same in the constrained and unconstrained regimes. The case of A1 > A1
will then be one in which the credit constraint does not bind, and vice versa for A1 < A1. It
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can be shown that
A1 = [1 + R  s (1 + )] 1
RK0

A
R  1
 1
1 
  A
1
1 
RK0


R  1
 
1 
+
RB0
K0
  (1  )K1 0 : (12)
Coherently, F
 
A1

is the probability that the economy is below the turning point between
the constrained and the unconstrained regime, i.e., the probability that the entrepreneur is
constrained. From (12), we can see that @A1=@s < 0. I.e., as the amount of debt that
can be contracted for a given level of collateral increases, the minimum realization of the
technology shock that makes the entrepreneur unconstrained decreases. In other words, a
higher s implies that the entrepreneur has higher chances of becoming nancially unconstrained
when technology uctuates.
Intuitively, when s is relatively high, the entrepreneur can obtain a debt level relatively
close to what she would have desired in the absence of credit constraints. Therefore, it takes
a relatively small positive technology shock to make the constraint slack by increasing income
and reducing the need for debt. In contrast, had s been relatively low, the entrepreneur
would be relatively far from obtaining the desired debt level, and it will require a much larger
technology shock to increase income su¢ ciently to make the entrepreneur desire less debt and
become unconstrained. In sum, the range of technology shocks that render the entrepreneur
unconstrained increases with s. This explains why the probability of becoming unconstrained,
1  F  A1, increases with s.
The next section introduces a DSGE model where the mechanisms we have just described
produce increasingly negative asymmetry in connection with a process of nancial leveraging.
Essentially, in such a model aggregate dynamics emerges as a mixture of the behavioral rules
governing consumption and investment decisions under di¤erent regimes. A higher probabil-
ity of non-binding nancial constraints will be associated with a more marked business cycle
asymmetry, as documented in Section 2.
4 A DSGE model
We adopt a standard real business cycle model augmented with collateral constraints, along the
lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), Liu et al. (2013), and Justiniano et al.
(2015); inter alia. The economy is populated by three types of agents, each of mass one. These
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agents di¤er by their discount factors, with the so-called patient households displaying the
highest degree of time preference, while impatient households and entrepreneurs have relatively
lower discount factors. Patient and impatient households supply labor, consume nondurable
goods and land services. Entrepreneurs only consume nondurable goods, and accumulate
both land and physical capital, which they rent to rms. The latter are of unit mass and
operate under perfect competition, taking labor inputs from both types of households, along
with capital and land from the entrepreneurs. The resulting gross product may be used for
investment and nondurable consumption.
4.1 Patient households
The utility function of patient households is given by:
E0
( 1X
t=0
 
P
t 
log
 
CPt   PCPt 1

+ "t log
 
HPt

+
P
1  'P
 
1 NPt
1 'P )
; (13)
0 < P < 1; 'P  0; 'P 6= 1; P > 0; 0  P < 1
where CPt denotes their nondurable consumption, H
P
t denotes land holdings, and N
P
t denotes
the fraction of time devoted to labor. Moreover, P is the discount factor, P measures the
degree of habit formation in nondurable consumption and 'P is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion pertaining to leisure. Finally, "t is a land-preference shock satisfying
log "t = log "+ " (log "t 1   log ") + ut; 0 < " < 1; (14)
where " > 0 denotes the steady-state value and where ut  N (0; 2"). Utility maximization is
subject to the budget constraint
CPt +Qt
 
HPt  HPt 1

+Rt 1BPt 1 = B
P
t +W
P
t N
P
t ; (15)
where BPt denotes the stock of one-period debt held at the end of period t, Rt is the associated
gross real interest rate, Qt is the price of land in units of consumption goods, and W Pt is the
real wage.
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4.2 Impatient households
The utility of impatient households takes the same form as that of patient households:
E0
( 1X
t=0
 
I
t 
log
 
CIt   ICIt

+ "t log
 
HIt

+
I
1  'I
 
1 N It
1 'I)
; (16)
0 < I < P ; 'I > 0; 'I 6= 1; I > 0; 0  I < 1
where, as for the patient households, CIt denotes nondurable consumption, H
I
t denotes land
holdings, and N It denotes the fraction of time devoted to labor. Householdsdi¤erence in the
degree of time preference is captured by imposing P > I . This ensures that, in the steady
state, patient and impatient households act as lenders and borrowers, respectively. Impatient
households are subject to the following budget constraint
CIt +Qt
 
HIt  HIt 1

+Rt 1BIt 1 = B
I
t +W
I
t N
I
t : (17)
Impatient households are also subject to a collateral constraint. The nature of the constraint
reects the fact that the vast majority of household debt is e¤ectively long-term. Specically,
building on the work of Kydland et al. (2016) and Gelain et al. (2017), we assume that
impatient householdsstock of debt, BIt , is constrained from above:
BIt  #IsIt
Et fQt+1gHIt
Rt
+
 
1  #I  1  IBIt 1; 0 < #I ; I < 1; (18)
where we assume that impatient households renance a fraction #I of their outstanding debt in
each period. Their newborrowing cannot exceed a fraction sIt of the expected present value
of their land holdings at the beginning of period t+ 1. Of the remaining, non-renanced, stock
of debt, impatient households are assumed to amortize a constant fraction, I .14 Finally, the
LTV ratio (or credit limit) on new borrowing, sIt , is stochastic and aims at capturing nancial
shocks (as in, e.g., Jermann and Quadrini, 2012 and Liu et al., 2013):
log sIt = log s
I + log st (19)
log st = s log st 1 + vt; 0 < s < 1; (20)
where vt  N (0; 2s) and sI , the steady-state LTV ratio, is a proxy for the average stance of
14Kydland et al. (2016) demonstrate that, with a time-varying amortization rate, the model-implied repay-
ment prole mimics that of a standard annuity loan arbitrarily well. Given the di¤erent focus of our paper, we
opt for a constant amortization rate, without loss of generality.
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credit availability to the impatient households.
4.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have preferences over nondurables only (see Iacoviello, 2005; Liu et al., 2013),
and maximize
E0
( 1X
t=0
 
E
t
log
 
CEt   ECEt 1
)
; 0 < E < P ; 0  E < 1; (21)
where CEt denotes entrepreneurial nondurable consumption. Utility maximization is subject
to the following budget constraint
CEt + It +Qt
 
HEt  HEt 1

+Rt 1BEt 1 = B
E
t + r
K
t 1Kt 1 + r
H
t 1H
E
t 1; (22)
where It denotes investment in physical capital, Kt 1 is the physical capital stock rented to
rms at the end of period t   1, and HEt 1 is the stock of land rented to rms. Finally, rKt 1
and rHt 1 are the rental rates on capital and land, respectively. Capital depreciates at the rate
, and its accumulation is subject to quadratic investment adjustment costs, so that its law of
motion reads as
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 +
"
1  

2

It
It 1
  1
2#
It; 0 <  < 1; 
 > 0: (23)
As the impatient households, entrepreneurs are subject to a credit constraint on their new
borrowing, but are able to use both capital and their holdings of land as collateral assets:15
BEt  #EsEt Et

QKt+1Kt +Qt+1H
E
t
Rt

+
 
1  #E  1  EBEt 1; 0 < #E; E < 1; (24)
where QKt denotes the price of installed capital in consumption units and s
E
t behaves in accor-
dance with
log sEt = log s
E + log st; (25)
where sE denotes entrepreneurssteady-state LTV ratio.16 Together with householdsaverage
LTV ratio, this parameter will assume a key role in the analysis of the evolving connection
15The importance of real estate as collateral for business loans has recently been emphasized by Chaney et
al. (2012) and Liu et al. (2013).
16As we discuss in Appendix A1, once the low-frequency components of the LTA series are removed, their
cyclical components strongly comove. In light of this, we opt for a common nancial shock.
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between macroeconomic asymmetries and nancial leverage.
4.4 Firms
Firms operate under perfect competition, employing a constant-returns-to-scale technology.
They rent capital and land from the entrepreneurs and hire labor from both types of households
in order to maximize their prots. The production technology for output, Yt, is given by:
Yt = At
h 
NPt
  
N It
1 i h 
HEt 1

K1 t 1
i1 
; 0 < ; ;  < 1; (26)
with total factor productivity At evolving according to
logAt = logA+ A (logAt 1   logA) + zt; 0 < A < 1; (27)
where A > 0 is the steady-state value of At, and zt  N (0; 2A).
4.5 Market clearing
Aggregate supply of land is xed at H, implying that land-market clearing is given by
H = HPt +H
I
t +H
E
t : (28)
The economy-wide net nancial position is zero, such that
BPt +B
I
t +B
E
t = 0: (29)
The labor markets for each labor type clear, and the aggregate resource constraint reads as
Yt = C
P
t + C
I
t + C
E
t + It: (30)
5 Equilibrium, solution and estimation
An equilibrium is dened as a sequence of prices and quantities which, conditional on the
sequence of shocks fAt; "t; stg1t=0 and initial conditions, satisfy the agents optimality con-
ditions, the budget and credit constraints, as well as the technological constraints and the
market-clearing conditions. The optimality conditions are reported in Appendix D. Due to the
assumptions about the discount factors, I < P and E < P , both collateral constraints are
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binding in the steady state. However, the optimal level of debt of one or both agents may fall
short of the credit limit when the model is not at its steady state, in which case the collateral
constraints will be non-binding.
To account for the occasionally binding nature of the credit constraints, our solution method
follows Laséen and Svensson (2011) and Holden and Paetz (2012). The idea is to introduce a
set of (anticipated) shadow value shocksto ensure that the shadow values associated with each
of the two collateral constraints remain non-negative at all times.17 We present the technical
details of the method in Appendix E.
5.1 Calibration and estimation
In the remainder we aim at assessing the extent to which a relaxation of the credit limits faced
by the borrowers can account for the evolution of the asymmetry of the business cycle. With
this in mind, we assign parameter values that allow us to match a set of characteristics of the
U.S. business cycle in the pre-1984 sample. We do this by calibrating a subset of the parameters,
while estimating the remaining ones using the simulated method of moments (SMM). Next, we
simulate the model for progressively higher average LTV ratios faced by households and rms,
and track the implied changes in the skewness of output and other macroeconomic variables,
as well as other business cycle statistics.
5.1.1 Calibrated parameters
The calibrated parameters are summarized in Panel A of Table 5. We choose to calibrate
a subset of the model parameters that can be pinned down using a combination of existing
studies and rst moments of U.S. data. We interpret one period as a quarter. We therefore set
P = 0:99, implying an annualized steady-state rate of interest of about 4%. Moreover, we set
I = E = 0:96, in the ballpark of the available estimates for relatively more impatient agents
(see, e.g., Iacoviello, 2005 and references therein). The utility weight of leisure is set to ensure
that both types of households work 1/4 of their time in the steady state. This implies a value
of i = 0:27 for i = fP; Ig. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is given by the inverse of 'i,
multiplied by the steady-state ratio of leisure to labor hours. Having pinned down the latter to
3, we set 'i = 9, i = fP; Ig, implying a Frisch elasticity of 1=3, a value which is broadly in line
with the available estimates (see, e.g., Herbst and Schorfheide, 2014). In line with Iacoviello
(2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set the share of labor income pertaining to patient
17For rst-order perturbations, we have veried that our solution produces similar simulated moments as
using the method of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015); see also Holden and Paetz (2012).
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households, , to 0:7. To pin down the labor income share we follow Elsby et al. (2013) and
use the o¢ cial estimate of the Bureau of Labor Statistics: The average value for the 1948-1983
time span implies  = 0:636.
Regarding the parameters governing the renancing and amortization of household debt,
we build on Kydland et al. (2016), who employ a steady-state amortization rate, I , of 0:014.
The implied maturity of a mortgage loan is close to 24 years, slightly longer than in Alpanda
and Zubairy (2017), who report that the average remaining term of outstanding household
mortgages in the US is close to 20 years.18 In addition, Kydland et al. (2016) report a re-
nancing share of total mortgage lending of 39%. As we show in Appendix D1, matching this
number implies a renancing parameter #I = 0:009. We then turn to the entrepreneurs. Most
of the existing business cycle studies treat corporate debt as short-term (see, e.g., Jermann
and Quadrini, 2012 and Liu et al., 2013), with a duration of one quarter. Chodorow-Reich and
Falato (2017) report an average maturity of long-term corporate debt of around 3 years, with
long-term debt dened as bank loans with at least one year of residual maturity. This implies
a weighted average maturity of total debt between 2 and 3 years. Based on Compustat data,
Poeschl (2018) reports an average maturity of corporate debt of 2:3 years. Relying on these
gures, we target a maturity of 2:5 years. To this end, we set E = 0:125.19 Thus, we pin
down the renancing rate, #E, so as to ensure that the steady-state fraction of total lending
that goes to renance old debt equals 83%, as in the Thompson Reuters LPC Dealscan data
(see Drechsel, 2018). This implies a value of #E = 0:698 (see Appendix D1 for the details on
this computation).
Given these parameters, we set ; "; ; and sI to jointly match the following four ratios (all
at the annual frequency) for the period from World War II until 1984: A ratio of residential
land to output of 1:098, a ratio of commercial land to output of 0:631, an average capital to
output ratio of 1:109, and an average ratio of private nonresidential investment to output of
0:230.20 The depreciation rate of capital consistent with these gures is 0:052, somewhat higher
18Following Alpanda and Zubairy (2017), we approximate maturity by two times the half-life of a loan.
19The amortization rates we employ are, if anything, on the conservative side. For households, Alpanda and
Zubairy (2017) and Gelain et al. (2017) both use slightly higher values than we do. For rms, it is important to
stress that business loans are frequently renegotiated. In a large sample of private credit agreements to publicly
traded U.S. rms, Roberts and Su (2009) nd that 90% of debt contracts with maturities longer than one year
are renegotiated prior to maturity. Moreover, Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017) emphasize the role of the
loan covenant channel: While only 10% of bank loans to rms had a remaining maturity of less than a year
at the onset of the nancial crisis in 2008, a much larger share of rms breached a covenant associated with
their loan during the crisis, thus allowing the lender to dictate new terms. We have veried that our results are
robust to realistic changes in the amortization rates for both households and rms.
20Our computations of these ratios largely follow those of Liu et al. (2013). For residential land, we use
owner-occupied real estate from the Flow of Funds tables. For commercial land, Liu et al. (2013) use Bureau of
Labor Statistics data on land inputs in production, which are not available for the sample period we consider.
18
than standard values, as it reects that our measure of capital excludes residential capital and
structures, which feature lower depreciation rates than, e.g., intellectual properties. We obtain
a value of  = 0:134, which, multiplied by (1  ), measures lands share of inputs, and a weight
of land in the utility function of " = 0:084. The implied value for impatient householdsaverage
LTV ratio is 0:673. The spread between the household and the entrepreneurial steady-state
LTV ratios is calibrated to match the average di¤erence in the low-frequency components over
the entire sample, which is roughly equal to the average di¤erence in the original series. As a
result, the entrepreneurial average LTV ratio, sE, is set to 0:763.21
5.1.2 Estimated parameters
We rely on the SMM to estimate the remaining model parameters, as this method is particularly
well-suited for DSGE models involving non-binding constraints or other non-linearities. Ruge-
Murcia (2012) studies the properties of SMM estimation of non-linear DSGE models, and
nds that this method is computationally e¢ cient and delivers accurate parameter estimates.
Moreover, Ruge-Murcia (2007) performs a comparison of the SMM with other widely used
estimation techniques applied to a basic RBC model, showing it fares quite well in terms of
accuracy and computing e¢ ciency, along with being less prone to misspecication issues than
likelihood-based methods.
We estimate the following parameters: The investment adjustment cost parameter (
), the
parameters measuring habit formation in consumption (P , I , and E), and the parameters
governing the persistence and volatility of the shocks (A; s; "; A; s; ").
22 In the estima-
tion, we use ve macroeconomic time series for the U.S. economy spanning the sample period
1952:I1984:II: The growth rates of real GDP, real private consumption, real non-residential
investment, real house prices, and the cyclical component of the LTA series in Figure 2, with
the trend being computed as in Müller and Watson (2018).23 The beginning of the sample
is dictated by the availability of quarterly Flow of Funds data, while the end of the sample
Instead, we compute the sum of the real estate holdings of nonnancial corporate and nonnancial noncorporate
businesses from the Flow of Funds, and then follow Liu et al. (2013) in multiplying this number by a factor
of 0:5 to impute the value of land. For capital, we compute the sum of the annual stocks of equipment and
intellectual property products of the private sector and consumer durables. We use the corresponding ow
variables to measure investment. Finally, we measure output as the sum of investment (as just dened) and
private consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services.
21These values for the average LTV ratios are lower than those typically employed in models calibrated over
the Great Moderation sample (see, e.g., Calza et al., 2013, Liu et al., 2013, and Justiniano et al., 2014), as our
calibration covers the period before the subsequent wave of nancial liberalization.
22In the estimation we impose that I = E , as initial attempts to identify these two parameters separately
proved unsuccessful.
23Since the cyclical components of the two LTA series are strongly correlated, we use the one obtained for
the households. All results are robust to using the corporate one.
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coincides with the onset of the Great Moderation.24 In the estimation, we match the follow-
ing empirical moments: The standard deviations and rst-order autoregressive parameters of
each of the ve variables, the correlation of consumption, investment, and house prices with
output, and the skewness of output, consumption, and investment. This gives a total of 16
moment conditions to estimate nine parameters. We provide more details about the data and
our estimation strategy in Appendix F.
The estimated parameters are reported in Panel B of Table 5. The estimate of 
 is in line
with existing results from estimated DSGE models (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 2014). The
degree of habit formation of patient households is close to the estimate of Liu et al. (2013),
whereas the estimated habit parameter for impatient households and entrepreneurs is somewhat
higher than most of the available estimates. The volatility and persistence parameters of the
technology shock are in line with those typically found in the real business cycle literature; see,
e.g., Mandelman et al., 2011. The nding of rather large land-demand shocks is consistent with
the results of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu et al. (2013). Finally, the nancial shocks in
our model are more volatile than found by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Liu et al. (2013),
but less persistent.
The model-implied matched moments and their data counterparts are reported in Table
F1 in Appendix F. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that we match quite closely a set of
non-targeted moments of interest. For instance, the ratio between the downside and the upside
semivolatility of real GDP growth and the standardized violence are 1:072 and 1:165, respec-
tively, while the corresponding numbers in the data are 1:061 and 1:217. Moreover, applying
the business cycle dating algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002) to the simulated data, we
obtain a duration of expansions and contractions of 22:156 and 3:765 quarters, respectively,
as compared with 15:333 and 3:714 quarters in the data. While the duration of expansions
is somewhat overestimated, these numbers conrm that the model generally produces a close
match of key properties of the data over the pre-1984 sample.
[Insert Table 5]
6 Asymmetric business cycles and collateral constraints
We can now examine how our model generates stronger business cycle asymmetries as nancial
leverage increases. We do so in three steps. First, we inspect a set of impulse responses to
24In fact, house prices are only available starting in 1963:I. We choose not to delay the beginning of other
data series to this date.
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build some intuition around the non-linear transmission of di¤erent shocks. Next, we present
various business cycle statistics obtained from simulating the model at di¤erent degrees of
leverage. Finally, we examine the behavior of business cycle asymmetry in conjunction with the
behavior of macroeconomic volatility. Our quantitative exercises primarily aim at assessing the
models ability to reproduce various dimensions of changing business cycle asymmetry, relying
exclusively on an increase in nancial leverage.25
6.1 Impulse-response analysis
To gain some preliminary insights into the nature of our framework, and how its properties
evolve under di¤erent LTV ratios, we study the propagation of di¤erent shocks. Figure 6
displays the response of output to a set of positive shocks, as well as the mirror image of the
response to equally-sized negative shocks, under di¤erent credit limits.26 For purely illustrative
purposes, we report impulse responses from a version of the model in which long-term debt is
temporarily shut o¤, i.e. where both corporate and household debt have a duration of one
period. This enhances the likelihood of observing episodes of non-binding collateral constraints
in the face of a one-o¤ expansionary shock.27
Looking at the rst row of the gure, technology shocks of either sign produce symmetric
responses under the calibrated LTV ratios for impatient households and entrepreneurs. By
contrast, at higher credit limits a positive technology shock renders the borrowing constraint
of the entrepreneurs slack for eight quarters, while impatient households remain constrained
throughout. Entrepreneurs optimally choose to borrow less than they are able to. This atten-
uates the expansionary e¤ect on their demand for land and capital, dampening and prolonging
the boom in aggregate economic activity. On the contrary, following a similar-sized negative
technology shock, the borrowing constraints remain binding throughout. As a result, both
impatient households and entrepreneurs are forced to cut back on their borrowing in response
to the drop in the value of their collateral assets. This produces a stronger and swifter output
response.
[Insert Figure 6]
25The aim of the exercise is not to account for the process of nancial innovation and liberalization lying
behind the increase in leverage in the last decades a task the model is not suitable for. Instead, we take this
increase for granted and examine how it has a¤ected the shape of the business cycle.
26Appendix G1 reports the corresponding impulse-responses for total consumption, investment, and total
debt.
27In the dynamic simulations reported in the next subsections, instead, combinations of all the shocks at their
baseline calibration have the potential to generate episodes of non-binding constraints, even in the presence of
long-term debt.
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As for the stochastic shifts in household preferences, the second row of Figure 6 indicates
that entrepreneurscollateral constraint becomes non-binding for three quarters after a positive
land demand shock in the scenario with high LTV ratios, while impatient households remain
constrained throughout. Therefore, entrepreneurs have no incentive to expand their borrowing
capacity by increasing their stock of land. By contrast, there is no attenuation of negative
shocks to the economy. In that case, both collateral constraints remain binding, giving rise to
a large and immediate output drop.
Similar observations apply to the transmission of the nancial shock. Under high aver-
age LTV ratios the entrepreneurs are unconstrained during the rst three periods following a
positive shock. For the reasons discussed above, this leads to a smooth response of output,
as compared with what happens following a negative shock. In this case entrepreneurs are
forced into a sizeable deleveraging, reducing the stock of land available for production. Also
impatient households deleverage and bring down their stock of land, which further depresses
the land price, and thus the borrowing capacity of both types of constrained agents. The result
is a large drop in output.
The impulse-response analysis o¤ers a clear message: As leverage increases, economic ex-
pansions tend to become smoother and more prolonged than contractions, paving the way to
a negatively skewed business cycle. This is broadly consistent with the observation of lower
volatility of the upside of the business cycle, as compared with its downside. Moreover, all
the three types of shock we consider have the potential to generate episodes of non-binding
constraints in response to positive innovations, thus contributing to business cycle asymmetries.
6.2 Leverage and asymmetries
To deepen our understanding of the model, we report a number of statistics from a rich set
of dynamic simulations based on a gradual increase in the average LTV ratios of the nan-
cially constrained agents. Following the approach of Müller and Watson (2018), Appendix A1
documents that, at very low frequencies, the LTA series for the household and corporate sec-
tor display strong comovement. Therefore, starting from their calibrated values, both agents
steady-state LTV ratios are progressively raised by 23 basis points, in line with the increase in
the low-frequency components of the LTA series reported in Figure 1 over the 1984-2016 time
window.28
28In each simulation reported in this section, the entrepreneurial average LTV ratio is adjusted to be 9
basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient householdscredit limit, in line with the baseline
calibration of the model. In Section 6.3.1, instead, we feed in the estimated low-frequency components of the
LTA ratios of households and rms. In both cases, we compute the statistics of interest as median values from
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Figure 7 displays two key dimensions of business cycle asymmetry: the left panel reports the
skewness of the growth rates of output, aggregate consumption and investment, while the right
panel reports the ratio between the downside and the upside semivolatility of output growth.
All the statistics in the left panel are negative at our calibrated average LTV ratios, and decline
thereafter. Similarly, we observe a stable increase in the ratio between the downside and the
upside semivolatility of output growth. Therefore, in connection with an increase in nancial
leverage, the model is capable of generating an increasingly negatively skewed business cycle.29
In fact, relying exclusively on the role of occasionally binding nancial constraints, the model
accounts for up to 50% of the asymmetry in the (year-on-year) growth of real GDP in the
post-1984 sample, as measured by both the skewness and the ratio between the downside and
the upside semivolatility of GDP growth.
[Insert Figure 7]
These properties reect into a marked transformation in the shape of the business cycle. As
leverage increases, the model is capable of reproducing relative changes in the average duration
of contractions and expansions that are broadly in line with those documented in Table 3:
While the former invariantly last one year, the latter increase their duration from around four-
ve years to roughly eight years (see Figure 8). On the other hand, higher leverage is associated
with relatively more severe contractionary episodes, as implied by the standardized violence
reported in the last panel of the gure. These ndings have a common root: An increase in
their average LTV ratios allows nancially constrained agents to be in a better position to
smooth consumption and investment during expansions.
It is important to mention that changes in business cycle skewness are predominantly driven
by the rm sector becoming increasingly unconstrained as the average LTV ratio increases.
Impatient households, instead, never nd themselves unconstrained, primarily because their
debt contracts are long-term, implying that shocks tend to a¤ect a relatively small part of the
stock of debt being renanced in each period.30 ;31 On the other hand, household borrowing
501 simulations, all of which run for 2000 periods.
29Though the functioning of occasionally binding constraints does not primarily hinge on the prices of col-
lateral assets, these play a quantitatively important role. To see this, the reader is referred to Figure G8 in
Appendix G4, where we report a set of statistics obtained by simulating an alternative version of the model
where the collateral assets are pledged at their steady-state prices.
30The frequency of non-binding constraints for both impatient households and the entrepreneurs is reported
in Figure G4 in Appendix G2. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) report that non-binding credit constraints were
prevalent among U.S. households from the late 1990s until the onset of the Great Recession. The di¤erence
between our results and their evidence mainly lies in the fact that they calibrate a smaller degree of inertia in
the borrowing limit.
31Moreover, households only feature one type of collateral asset in their borrowing constraint. This limits
the amplication of shocks a¤ecting their borrowing capacity.
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helps to account for some desirable quantitative properties, primarily a sizeable increase in the
duration of expansions (see Appendix G3).
[Insert Figure 8]
6.3 Skewness and volatility
Recent statistical evidence has demonstrated that the Great Moderation was never associated
with smaller or less frequent downturns, but has been driven exclusively by the characteristics
of the expansions, whose magnitude has declined over time (Gadea-Rivas et al., 2014, 2015).
We now examine this nding in conjunction with the change in the asymmetry of the business
cycle, which has largely occurred over the same time span.
[Insert Figure 9]
The left panel of Figure 9 reports the standard deviation of output growth as a function
of the average LTV ratios. As shown by Jensen et al. (2018) in a similar model, macroeco-
nomic volatility displays a hump-shaped pattern: Starting from low credit limits, higher avail-
ability of credit allows nancially constrained agents to engage in debt-nanced consumption
and investment, as dictated by their relative impatience, thus reinforcing the macroeconomic
repercussions of shocks that a¤ect their borrowing capacity. This pattern eventually reverts,
as higher LTV ratios increase the likelihood that credit constraints become non-binding. In
such cases, the consumption and investment decisions of households and entrepreneurs may
delink from changes in the value of their collateral assets, dampening the volatility of aggregate
economic activity. In fact, at the upper end of the range of average LTV ratios we consider,
volatility drops below the value we match under the baseline calibration.
A key property of a model with occasionally binding constraints is that the volatility reversal
is much stronger for positive than for negative shocks, in the face of which nancial constraints
tend to remain binding. This inherent property of our framework indicates that the drop in
output volatility observed beyond sI  0:8 is mostly connected with expansionary periods. The
right panel of Figure 9 conrms this view: Here, we compare the volatility of expansionary and
contractionary episodes, respectively, as a function of the average LTV ratios. The volatility
of expansions is always lower than that of contractions, and declines over the entire range of
average credit limits. The volatility of contractions, on the other hand, increases steadily.
Notably, increasing leverage allows the model to account for di¤erent correlations between
the volatility and the skewness of output growth. Based on the comparison between Figure
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7 and the left panel of Figure 9, this correlation is increasingly negative until sI  0:8, thus
becoming positive as nancial deepening reaches very advanced stages. These results are
reminiscent of the evidence reported by Bekaert and Popov (2015), who document a positive
long-run correlation between the volatility and skewness of output growth in a large cross-
section of countries, but also a negative short-run relationship: As nancial leverage reaches a
certain level across advanced economies, our results predict that skewness and volatility will
eventually decline in conjunction.
A word of caution is in order at this stage. While our framework points to a hump-shaped
relationship between credit limits and macroeconomic volatility, the key driver of business cy-
cle asymmetry endogenous shifts between binding and non-binding collateral constraints in
itself works as an impetus of lower macroeconomic volatility, ceteris paribus. Thus, despite our
analysis not warranting the claim that the empirical developments in the volatility and skewness
of the business cycle necessarily have the same origin, higher credit limits do eventually lead to
a drop in the overall volatility of our model economy by making nancial constraints increas-
ingly slack.32 A related question is whether our main nding of increasingly negative business
cycle asymmetry would survive in the presence of a reduction in macroeconomic volatility of
the magnitude observed during the Great Moderation. The next subsection tackles this point.
6.3.1 Counterfactual exercises: accounting for the Great Moderation
We now turn to a counterfactual exercise aimed at reconciling our main nding of increasingly
negative business cycle asymmetry with a reduction in macroeconomic volatility of the mag-
nitude observed during the Great Moderation.33 To this end, we conduct two experiments: In
the rst experiment, we take a perspective similar to that of Section 6.2, but feed in the actual,
estimated low-frequency components of the LTA ratios of households and rms, respectively,
rather than relying on a linear and parallel increase in the leverage of the two agents.34 In
the second experiment, we repeat the exercise in combination with a gradual reduction of the
32In fact, several authors have pointed to nancial liberalization and the associated easing of the nancial
constraints of both households and rms as a contributor to the Great Moderation (see, e.g., Justiniano and
Primiceri, 2008 and, for a review of the literature, Den Haan and Sterk, 2010).
33In this respect, it is important to recognize that none of the factors to which the Great Moderation is
typically ascribed are featured in our model. The most popular narratives about the Great Moderation are a
drop in the volatility of economic shocks (see, e.g., Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008) and improvements in the
conduct of monetary policy (see, e.g., Boivin and Giannoni, 2006).
34Specically, for each year in the 1980-2016 time window, we feed in the annual average of the quarterly
long-run LTV components, as depicted in Figure A.1 in Appendix A1. To make up for the di¤erence in levels
between the aggregated series and the (somewhat higher) calibrated LTV ratios, we add an (agent-specic)
constant to the low-frequency components. If, at any time, the implied LTV ratio exceeds 0:99, we cap it at
this value. The implied paths of the LTV series are reported in Figure G10 of Appendix G5.
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standard deviations of all the shocks in the model. This reduction is reverse-engineered to
obtain a decline in macroeconomic volatility similar to the one observed in the data during
the Great Moderation. Specically, we target a decline in the volatility of output growth of
around 40%, in line with the evidence reported in Section 2.1. To this end, we assume that
the reduction in the magnitude of the shocks starts in 1984, and is completed by 1989.35
[Insert Figure 10]
The results from our experiments are reported in Figure 10: here, the skewness, the ratio
between the downside and the upside semivolatility, and the volatility of output growth are
reported over the 1980-2016 time span. In both experiments, the skewness displays a decline of
roughly the same magnitude as that observed in Figure 7, reaching a level of about  0:6 by the
end of the sample; about half of the corresponding level reported in Table 1.36 The ratio between
the business cycle semivolatilities behaves coherently. As for the standard deviation, it drops
by about 40% when we reduce the size of the shocks hitting the economy (by construction),
while displaying a very small decline in the alternative scenario. Although the increase in LTV
ratios in these experiments is not too di¤erent from the exercises in the previous subsection, it
is important to stress that the coexistence of a large change in the asymmetry and the volatility
of the business cycle is not trivial: All else equal, reducing the size of the shocks hitting the
economy lowers the probability that collateral constraints become non-binding, thus potentially
weakening the key driver of business cycle asymmetry in the model. However, we nd that
smaller shocks only slightly mitigate the potential to produce sizeable non-linearities.
7 Debt overhang and business cycle asymmetries
Several authors have recently pointed to the nature of the boom phase of the business cycle
as a key determinant of the subsequent recession. For example, using data for 14 advanced
economies for the period 18702008, Jordà et al. (2013) nd that more credit-intensive expan-
sions tend to be followed by deeper recessions, whether or not the recession is accompanied by
a nancial crisis.
35This exercise is thus consistent with the Good Lucknarrative of the Great Moderation (Stock andWatson,
2003). Throughout both experiments, we keep the relative size of the shocks xed and in accordance with the
estimation reported in Section 5.1.2. The path of the scaling factor is illustrated in Figure G9 of Appendix G5.
The results are generally robust to alternative choices of the transition window.
36The initial hike (drop) in the skewness (ratio between the downside and upside semivolatility) of output
growth can be explained by the fact that, in the face of a reduction in the volatility of the shocks taking place
over a rather limited time span, the LTV ratios of both agents rise over a much larger time window.
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In this section we demonstrate that our model is also capable of reproducing these empirical
facts. Figure 11 reports the results of the following experiment: Starting in the steady state, we
generate a boom-bust cycle for di¤erent average LTV ratios. We rst feed the economy with a
series of positive shocks of all three types in the rst ve periods (up to period 0 in the gure).
During the boom phase, we calibrate the size of the expansionary shocks hitting the economy
so as to make sure that the boom in output is identical across all the experiments. Hereafter,
starting in period 1 in the gure, we shock the economy with contractionary shocks of all three
types for two periods, after which the negative shocks are phased outover the next three
periods. Crucially, the contractionary shocks are identical across calibrations. This ensures
that the severity of the recession is solely determined by the endogenous response of the model
at each di¤erent LTV ratio.37 As the gure illustrates, the deepness of the contraction increases
with the steady-state LTV ratios. A boom of a given size is followed by a more severe recession
when debt is relatively high, as compared with the case of more scarce credit availability. At
higher average LTV ratios, households and entrepreneurs are more leveraged during the boom,
and they therefore need to face a more severe process of deleveraging when the recession hits.
By contrast, when credit levels are relatively low, nancially constrained agents face lower
credit availability to shift consumption and investment forward in time during booms, and are
therefore less vulnerable to contractionary shocks.
[Insert Figure 11]
We next focus on the nature of the boom and how this spills over to the ensuing contraction.
The left panel of Figure 12 compares the path of output in two di¤erent boom-bust cycles,
while the right panel shows the corresponding paths for aggregate debt. In each panel, the
dashed line represents a non-nancial boom generated by a combination of technology and
land-demand shocks, while the solid line denotes a nancial boom generated by credit limit
shocks.38 We calibrate the size of the expansionary shocks so as to deliver an identical increase
in output during each type of boom (which lasts for ve periods, up until period 0 in the gure).
As in the previous experiment, we then subject the economy to identical sets of contractionary
shocks of all three types, so as to isolate the role played by the specic type of boom in shaping
37During both the boom and the bust we keep the relative size of the three shocks xed and equal to their
estimated standard deviations. However, we set their persistence parameters to zero, in order to avoid that the
shape of the recession may be determined by lagged values of the shocks during the boom. Finally, we make
sure that impatient households and entrepreneurs remain constrained in all periods of each of the cases, so as
to enhance comparability.
38In the non-nancial boom we keep the relative size of the technology and land-demand shocks in line with
the values estimated in Section 5.1.2. As in the previous experiment, we set the persistence parameters of all
the shock processes to zero.
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the subsequent recession. The contractionary shocks hit in periods 1 and 2 in the gure, and
are then phased outover the next three periods. While the size of the expansion in output is
identical in each type of boom, the same is not the case for total debt, which increases by more
than twice as much during the nancial boom. The consequences of this build-up of credit
show up during the subsequent contraction, which is much deeper following the nancially
fueled expansion, in line with the empirical ndings of Jordà et al. (2013). As in Mian and
Su(2010), this exercise conrms that the macroeconomic repercussions of constrained agents
deleveraging increases in the extent of leveraging.39
[Insert Figure 12]
8 Concluding comments
We have documented how di¤erent dimensions of business cycle asymmetry in the US and
other G7 countries have changed over the last decades, and pointed to the concurrent increase
in private debt as a potential driver of these phenomena. We have presented a dynamic general
equilibrium model with credit-constrained households and rms, in which increasing leverage
translates into a more negatively skewed business cycle. This nding relies on the occasionally
binding nature of nancial constraints: As their credit limits increase, nancially constrained
agents are more likely to become unconstrained during booms, while credit constraints tend to
remain binding during downturns.
These insights shed new light on the analysis of the business cycle and its developments.
The Great Moderation is widely regarded as the main development in the statistical properties
of the U.S. business cycle since the 1980s. We point to a simultaneous change in the shape of
the business cycle closely connected with nancial factors. Enhanced credit access as observed
over the last few decades implies both a prolonging and a smoothing of expansionary periods
as well as less frequent yet, relatively more dramatic economic contractions, exacerbated
by deeper deleveraging episodes. As for the rst part of this story, several contributions have
pointed to the attenuation of the upside of the business cycle as the main statistical trait of the
Great Moderation. Nevertheless, insofar as nancial liberalization and enhanced credit access
39Addressing the endogeneity of credit and business cycle dynamics, Gadea-Rivas and Perez-Quiros (2015)
stress that growing credit is not a predictor of future contractions. Our model simulations are consistent with
this view. In fact, as displayed by Figure 12, output and credit growth are strongly correlated, regardless of
whether the boom is driven by nancial shocks. At the same time, the model predicts that a boom driven by
nancial shocks is associated with a stronger increase in debt and a deeper contraction, as compared with an
equally-sized non-nancial boom.
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can be pointed to as key drivers of an increasingly asymmetric business cycle, the second insight
implies that large contractionary episodes, albeit less frequent, might represent a new normal.
Our results are also of interest to macroprudential policymakers, as we complement a recent
empirical literature emphasizing that the seeds of the recession are sown during the boom (see,
e.g., Mian et al., 2017). The nature of the expansionary phase, as much as its size, is an
important determinant of the ensuing downturn, and policymakers should pay close attention
to the build-up of credit during expansions in macroeconomic activity.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. The skewness of the U.S. business cycle
Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Year-on-Year Growth
1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II 1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II
GDP -0.118 -1.212 -0.098 -1.304
[-0.325 ; 0.088] [-1.559 ; -0.573] [-0.285 ; 0.073] [-1.516 ; -0.936]
Consumption -0.506 -0.468 -0.202 -1.001
[-1.134 ; 0.128] [-0.725 ; -0.119] [-0.368 ; -0.038] [-1.181 ; -0.737]
Investment -0.210 -0.827 -0.007 -1.399
[-0.497 ; 0.096] [-1.161 ; -0.277] [-0.280 ; 0.229] [-1.684 ; -0.983]
Notes: For di¤erent macroeconomic aggregates, we report the coe¢ cient of skewness computed on the
quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year growth rates, over the 1947:I-1984:II and 1984:III-2016:II samples. 68%
condence intervals (in brackets) are constructed by bootstrapping with 5000 replications. Data source: Federal
Reserve Economic Data.
Table 2. U.S. business cycle volatility and semivolatilities
GDP growth (quarter-on-quarter) GDP growth (year-on-year)
1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II 1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II
 4.702 2.358 3.071 1.747
 =+ 1.035 1.289 1.061 1.364
[0.977; 1.0940] [1.141; 1.409] [1.007; 1.119] [1.245; 1.467]
Notes: Table 2 reports the volatility of real GDP growth (both on a quarter-on-quarter and
on a year-on-year basis) and the ratio between its downside and upside semivolatility. Speci-
cally,  =
qPT
t=1 (xt   x)2 =T , while the upside and downside semivolatility are dened as + =qPT
t=1 (xt   x)2 1 (xt  x) =T and   =
qPT
t=1 (xt   x)2 1 (xt < x) =T , respectively, where 1 (z)
is an indicator function taking value 1 when condition z is true, and 0 otherwise. 68% condence
intervals (in brackets) are constructed by bootstrapping with 5000 replications. Data source: Federal
Reserve Economic Data.
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Table 3. The violence of recessions in the US
Violence Std. Violence Duration (quarters)
Contractions Expansions
1953:II 1954:II 3.411 0.949 4 
1957:III 1958:II 7.309 2.542 3 13
1960:II 1961:I 1.801 0.572 3 8
1969:IV 1970:IV 0.471 0.267 4 35
1973:IV 1975:I 2.529 1.228 5 12
1980:I 1980:III 4.401 1.775 2 20
1981:III 1982:IV 2.679 1.190 5 4
1990:III 1991:I 2.651 3.624 2 31
2001:I 2001:IV 1.267 1.785 3 40
2007:IV 2009:II 2.891 3.297 6 24
Average
Pre-1984 3.229 1.217 3.714 15.333
Post-1984 2.270 2.902 3.667 31.667
Notes: For every recession, we calculate Violenceas the annualized fall of real GDP from the peak to
the trough of the contractionary episode, divided by the length of the recession; Std. Violencestandardizes
the violence of the recession by the average business cycle volatility prior to the recession. The business cycle
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the year-on-year growth rate of real GDP over a 5-year
window. We exclude the period running up to the recession by calculating the standard deviation up to a year
before the recession begins. Data source: NBER.
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Table 5. Parameter values
Panel A: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
P Discount factor, patient households 0:99
i; i = fI; Eg Discount factor, impatient households and entrepreneurs 0:96
'i; i = fP; Ig Curvature of utility of leisure 9
i; i = fP; Ig Weight of labor disutility 0:27
" Weight of land utility 0:084
 Non-labor input share of land 0:134
 Labor share of production 0:636
 Capital depreciation rate 0:052
 Income share of patient households 0:7
sI Initial loan-to-value ratio, impatient households 0:673
sE Initial loan-to-value ratio, entrepreneurs 0:763
#I Renancing rate, impatient households 0:009
#E Renancing rate, entrepreneurs 0:698
I Amortization rate, impatient households 0:014
E Amortization rate, entrepreneurs 0:125
Panel B: Estimated parameters
Parameter Description Value

 Investment adjustment cost parameter 8:933
(2:940)
P Habit formation, patient households 0:361
(0:112)
I Habit formation, impatient households + entrepreneurs 0:941
(0:045)
A Persistence of technology shock 0:987
(0:044)
s Persistence of credit-limit shock 0:853
(0:043)
" Persistence of land-demand shock 0:880
(0:398)
A Std. dev. of technology shock 0:009
(0:001)
s Std. dev. of credit-limit shock 0:033
(0:001)
" Std. dev. of land-demand shock 0:072
(0:356)
Note: The standard errors of the estimated parameters are reported in brackets.
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Figure 1. Growth rates of U.S. real GDP
Notes: Year-on-year rate of growth of U.S. real GDP over the 1947:I-2016:II sample. The green bands
correspond to the 68% and 90% condence intervals from a Gaussian density tted on the 1947:I-
1984:II and 1984:III-2016:II samples. The vertical shadowed bands denote the NBER recession
episodes. Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Figure 2. Household and corporate leverage in the US
Notes: Left panel: the solid-blue line graphs the ratio between loans to households and GDP, while
the dashed-red line reports the same variable at the corporate level. Right panel: the solid-blue
line graphs the ratio between households liabilities and assets, while the dashed-red line reports
the same variable at the corporate level. The vertical shadowed bands denote the NBER recession
episodes. Data source: Flow of Funds data, Financial Accounts of the US. See Appendix A for
further details.
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Figure 3. Leverage and asymmetry: G7 countries
Notes: The left panel reports the skewness of quarter-on-quarter GDP growth, computed for the G7
countries, against their loan-to-GDP ratio. The right panel replaces the skewness of GDP growth
with the ratio between its downside and upside semivolatilities ( =+). To construct the data
points, we take quarterly GDP growth rates for all the countries under investigation, and construct
8-year rolling windows of data. Thus, we compute country-window specic moments, and relate
them to the average credit-to-GDP ratio calculated over the same sample. The dots displayed in
the gure are summary data for each moment, computed by grouping the credit-to-GDP ratio into
30 bins. The regression line is obtained by assuming a quadratic relationship between the two
variables (accounting for country-level xed e¤ects). Data source: OECD and Jordà-Schularick-
Taylor Macrohistory Database.
Figure 4. Leverage and asymmetry across U.S. States
Notes: The left panel plots the violence of the Great Recession in each U.S. State against the average
debt-to-income ratio at the household level over the period 2003:I-2007:I. To allow for the fact that
the recession does not begin/end at the same time throughout the US, we calculate the start (end)
of the recession in a given state as the period with the highest (lowest) level of real Gross State
Product (GSP) in a window that goes from 5 quarters before (after) to one quarter after (before)
the NBER dates. The right-hand panel plots the skewness of year-on-year real GSP growth over
the 2005:I-2016:I period against the average debt-to-income ratio. In each panel we report the p-
values associated with the slope coe¢ cient: the rst p-value is calculated on the slope coe¢ cient
estimated by OLS, while the second p-value refers to the slope estimated by excluding outliers (i.e.,
the observations whose standardized residuals from a rst stage OLS regression are classied as
being out of the 5/95% Gaussian condence interval). In both cases we compute White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Data sources: State Level Household Debt Statistics
produced by the New York Fed and BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 5. GSP dynamics and household leverage
Notes: Growth rates of two synthetic GSP series obtained by ranking the U.S. States according to
their average debt-to-income ratio in the 5 years before the Great Recession. The solid-blue line is
calculated from the median real GSP of the top 10 states, while the dashed-green line is obtained
from the median for the bottom 10 states. The resulting statistics have been normalized to zero
at the beginning of the Great Recession (i.e., 2007:IV). The vertical shadowed band denotes the
2007:IV-2009:II recession episode. Data sources: State Level Household Debt Statistics produced
by the New York Fed and BEA Regional Economic Accounts.
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Figure 6. Impulse responses for di¤erent degrees of leverage
Notes: Impulse responses of output (in percentage deviation from the steady state) to a one-standard
deviation shock to technology (row 1), a two-standard deviation shock to land demand (row 2), and a
one-standard deviation shock to credit limits (row 3) in a model with debt duration of one quarter.
Left column: sI = 0:67; sE = 0:76; right column: sI = 0:85; sE = 0:94. The shadowed bands
indicate the periods in which the entrepreneurs are nancially unconstrained.
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Figure 7. Business cycle asymmetry
Notes: The left panel of the gure reports the skewness of the year-on-year growth rate of output,
consumption and investment, while the right panel displays the ratio between the downside and the
upside semivolatility of year-on-year output growth, for di¤erent average LTV ratios faced by the
nancially constrained agents. To identify the recessionary episodes in the simulated series, we use
the Harding and Pagan (2002) algorithm. Across all the simulations the entrepreneurial average LTV
ratio is adjusted to be 9 basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient households
credit limits, in line with the baseline calibration of the model.
44
F
ig
ur
e
8.
E
xp
an
si
on
s,
co
nt
ra
ct
io
ns
an
d
le
ve
ra
ge
N
ot
es
:
T
he
r
st
tw
o
pa
ne
ls
re
p
or
t
th
e
du
ra
ti
on
(i
n
qu
ar
te
rs
)
of
ex
pa
ns
io
ns
an
d
co
nt
ra
ct
io
ns
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
T
he
la
st
pa
ne
l
di
sp
la
ys
th
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
vi
ol
en
ce
of
re
ce
ss
io
na
ry
ep
is
od
es
.
T
o
id
en
ti
fy
ex
pa
ns
io
ns
an
d
co
nt
ra
ct
io
ns
in
th
e
si
m
ul
at
ed
gr
os
s
ou
tp
ut
se
ri
es
,
w
e
us
e
th
e
H
ar
di
ng
an
d
P
ag
an
(2
00
2)
al
go
ri
th
m
.
W
e
co
m
pu
te
th
e
vi
ol
en
ce
as
th
e
av
er
ag
e
fa
ll
of
ou
tp
ut
ov
er
a
gi
ve
n
re
ce
ss
io
n,
di
vi
de
d
by
th
e
le
ng
th
of
th
e
re
ce
ss
io
n
it
se
lf
.
F
in
al
ly
,
w
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
e
th
e
vi
ol
en
ce
by
m
ea
ns
of
th
e
vo
la
ti
lit
y
of
ye
ar
-o
n-
ye
ar
ou
tp
ut
gr
ow
th
ov
er
th
e
v
e
ye
ar
s
pr
io
r
to
th
e
re
ce
ss
io
n.
A
ll
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
co
nd
it
io
na
l
on
di
¤
er
en
t
av
er
ag
e
LT
V
ra
ti
os
fa
ce
d
by
th
e
n
an
ci
al
ly
co
ns
tr
ai
ne
d
ag
en
ts
.
A
cr
os
s
al
l
th
e
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
th
e
en
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
ia
l
av
er
ag
e
LT
V
ra
ti
o
is
ad
ju
st
ed
to
b
e
9
ba
si
s
p
oi
nt
s
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
an
y
va
lu
e
w
e
co
ns
id
er
fo
r
im
pa
ti
en
t
ho
us
eh
ol
ds

cr
ed
it
lim
it
s,
in
lin
e
w
it
h
th
e
ba
se
lin
e
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
of
th
e
m
od
el
.
45
Figure 9. Leverage and volatility
Notes: The left panel reports the standard deviation of year-on-year output growth, while the right
panel reports the standard deviation of expansions (solid-blue line) and contractions (dashed-green
line) in economic activity. These are determined based on whether output is above or below its
steady-state level. Across all the simulations the entrepreneurial average LTV ratio is adjusted so
as to be 9 basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient householdscredit limits, in
line with the baseline calibration of the model.
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Figure 11. Boom-bust cycles and leverage
Notes: The gure shows the path of output (in percentage deviation from the steady state). Starting
in steady state, we generate a boom-bust cycle for di¤erent steady-state debt levels, as implied by
di¤erent average LTV ratios. We rst feed the economy with a series of positive shocks during the
rst ve periods, up until period 0. The size of the expansionary shocks is set so as to make sure
that the boom is identical across all the calibrations. Thus, we shock the economy with identical
contractionary shocks for two periods, after which the negative shocks are phased out over the
next three periods, i.e., their size is reduced successively and linearly. Across all the simulations the
entrepreneurial average LTV ratio is adjusted so as to be 9 basis points greater than any value we
consider for impatient householdscredit limits, in line with the baseline calibration of the model.
Figure 12. Financial vs. non-nancial recessions
Notes: The gure shows the path of output (left panel) and aggregate debt (right panel), both in
percentage deviations from the steady state. The solid-blue line represents a nancial boom, while
the dashed-green line represents a non-nancial boom. Impatient households and entrepreneurs
remain constrained throughout both types of booms. In this experiment, we set the average LTV
ratios to sI= 0:85 and sE= 0:94. We calibrate the size of the expansionary shocks so as to deliver
an identical increase in output during each type of boom (which lasts for ve periods, up until period
0). We then subject the economy to identical sets of contractionary shocks of all three types. The
contractionary shocks hit in periods 1 and 2, and are then phased outover the next three periods,
i.e., their size is reduced linearly.
48
Appendix A. Assets and liabilities in the US
Figure 2 shows the ratio of liabilities to assets for households and rms in the United States,
respectively. All data are taken from FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data), Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. The primary source is Flow of Funds data from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. For business liabilities we use the sum of debt securities and loans
of nonnancial corporate and noncorporate businesses. For assets we follow Liu et al. (2013)
and use data on both sectorsequipment and software as well as real estate at market value.
For households and nonprot organizations, we again use the sum of debt securities and loans
as data for liabilities and use as assets both groupsreal estate at market value and equipment
and software of nonprot organizations.
The ratios reported in Figure 2 are aggregate measures, and may therefore not reect actual
loan-to-value (LTV) requirements for the marginal borrower. Nonetheless, we report these
gures since the ow of funds data deliver a continuous measure of LTV ratios covering the
entire period 19522016. For households, the aggregate ratio of credit to assets in the economy
is likely to understate the actual downpayment requirements faced by households applying for
a mortgage loan, since loans and assets are not evenly distributed across households. In our
model we distinguish between patient and impatient households, and we assume that only
the latter group is faced with a collateral constraint. In the data we do not make such a
distinction, so that the LTV ratio for households reported in Figure 2 represents an average of
the LTV of patient households (savers), who are likely to have many assets and small loans,
and that of impatient households (borrowers), who on average have larger loans and fewer
assets. Justiniano et al. (2014) use the Survey of Consumer Finances and identify borrowers
as households with liquid assets of a value less than two months of their income. Based on the
surveys from 1992, 1995, and 1998, they arrive at an average LTV ratio for this group of around
0.8, while our measure uctuates around 0.5 during the 1990s. Following Duca et al. (2011), an
alternative approach is to focus on rst-time home-buyers, who are likely to fully exploit their
borrowing capacity. Using data from the American Housing Survey, these authors report LTV
ratios approaching 0.9 towards the end of the 1990s; reaching a peak of almost 0.95 before the
onset of the recent crisis. While these alternative approaches are likely to result in higher levels
of LTV ratios, we are especially interested in the development of these ratios over a rather
long time span. While we believe the Flow of Funds data provide the most comprehensive and
consistent time series evidence in this respect, substantial increases over time in the LTV ratios
faced by households have been extensively documented; see, e.g., Campbell and Hercowitz
(2009), Duca et al. (2011), Favilukis et al. (2017), and Boz and Mendoza (2014). It should
be noted that for households, various government-sponsored programs directed at lowering the
down-payment requirements faced by low-income or rst-time home buyers have been enacted
by di¤erent administrations (Chambers et al., 2009). These are likely to have contributed to
the increase in the ratio of loans to assets illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.
Likewise, the aggregate ratio of business loans to assets in the data may cover for a disparate
distribution of credit and assets across rms. In general, the borrowing patterns and conditions
of rms are more di¢ cult to characterize than those of households, as their credit demand is
more volatile, and their assets are less uniform and often more di¢ cult to assess. Liu et al.
(2013) also use Flow of Funds data to calibrate the LTV ratio of the entrepreneurs, and arrive
at a value of 0.75. This ratio is based on the assumption that commercial real estate enters
with a weight of 0.5 in the asset composition of rms. The secular increase in rm leverage
over the second half of the 20th century has also been documented by Graham et al. (2014)
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using data from the Compustat database.40,41 These authors report loan-to-asset ratios that
are broadly in line with those we present. More generally, an enhanced access of rms to credit
markets over time has been extensively documented in the literature, as also discussed in the
main text.
A1. Long-run properties of the LTV ratios
In this subsection we investigate the low-frequency properties of the LTV ratios of households
and the corporate sector over the 1952:I-2016:II time window. We follow the approach of Müller
and Watson (2018), who develop methods to investigate the long-run comovement of two time
series.
Since it has been argued that the amplitude of the nancial cycle can potentially be much
longer than the business cycle (Borio, 2014), we focus on the very low-frequency movements in
the LTV ratios. In our baseline specication, we focus on uctuations over periods longer than
30 years. Table A1 reports the long-run correlation coe¢ cients, as well as the slope coe¢ cient
of a linear regression relating household to corporate debt, together with the 68% condence
interval. Figure A1 reports the two LTV ratios, together with their low-frequency components.
The two series display strong comovement at the very low frequency, with the slope coe¢ cient
containing 1 in the condence interval. Between 1984 and 2016, this component increased by
20 and 23 basis points for households and rms, respectively. It is also worth emphasizing
that, once we remove low-frequency variation in the LTV ratios, their cyclicalvariations are
strongly correlated (about 65%). This evidence supports our modelling choice for the behavior
of the LTV ratios, with the trend components for the household and the corporate sector rising
in tandem by 23 basis points in Section 6.2, and a common cyclical component. The spread
between the household and entrepreneurial steady-state LTV ratios is set to match the average
di¤erence in the low-frequency components over the entire sample, which is roughly equal to
the average di¤erence in the original series.
Table A1 also reports additional robustness results for di¤erent choices of the minimum-
length period of the low-frequency component. The results of the baseline specication are
quite robust for reasonable variations of the cut-o¤ choice.
40It should be mentioned that they also show a Flow of Funds-based measure of debt to total assets at
historical cost (or book value) for rms. The increase over time in this measure is smaller. However, we believe
that the ratio of debt to pledgeable assets at market values (as shown in Figure 2) is the relevant measure for
rmsaccess to collateralized loans, and hence more appropriate for our purposes.
41We emphasize that Figure 2 reports a gross measure of rm leverage. Bates et al. (2009) report that rm
leverage net of cash holdings has been declining since 1980, but that this decline is entirely due to a large
increase in cash holdings.
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Table A1. Household and corporate LTV ratios in the long run
Periods longer than 30 yearsb b
0.847 1.224
[0.511 - 0.947] [0.680 - 1.618]
Periods longer than 35 yearsb b
0.776 1.317
[0.250 - 0.950] [0.439 - 1.952]
Periods longer than 25 yearsb b
0.892 1.160
[0.703 - 0.957] [0.769 - 1.605]
Notes: Table A1 summarizes the long-run covariance (^ denotes the correlation coe¢ cient and ^
denotes the slope coe¢ cient of the linear relationship) and the 68% condence set (in brackets) for
the household and the corporate LTV ratios.
Figure A1. Low-frequency components of the LTV ratios
Notes: Each plot reports the LTV ratio (solid-blue line) and its low-frequency component (dashed-
green line). The left panel reports data for the household sector, whereas the right panel refers to
the corporate sector.
Appendix B. Additional empirical evidence
B1. Time-varying volatility and skewness
In the main text we report evidence on the skewness of real GDP growth being di¤erent
before and during the Great Moderation. The choice of a cut-o¤ date is inspired by a large
literature that has documented a drop in the volatility over the two samples. This exercise
entails a possible drawback: The estimates of the skewness can be biased by the rst and
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second moment of the business cycle changing over time. In particular: i) There is now ample
evidence that the volatility of the business cycle displays a cyclical behavior (see, e.g., Kim and
Nelson, 1999; and McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000) and ii) the long-run growth rate of the
economy since around 2000 is substantially lower than the average for the entire sample (see,
e.g., Antolin-Diaz et al., 2017). To account for these issues we report a measure of time-varying
skewness of real GDP growth for the entire sample, relying on a nonparametric estimator. To
this end, take a generic time series, yt, so that its variance and skewness can be respectively
calculated as
2 = V ar (yt) =
1
T
TX
t=1
(yt   )2 ;
% = Skew (yt) =
(
1
T
TX
t=1
(yt   )2
) 3=2(
1
T
TX
t=1
(yt   )3
)
;
where T denotes the number of observations in the sample and  = E (yt) = T 1
PT
t=1 yt is
the sample average. Dene the sample autocovariance and autocorrelation as
 =
1
T
T j jX
t=1
 
yt j j   

(yt   ) ;
 =

2
:
When yt is a Gaussian process with absolutely summable autocovariances, it can be shown
that the standard errors associated with the two measures are:42
V ar
 
2

=
2
T
 1X
= 1

!2
;
V ar (%) =
6
T
1X
= 1
3 :
In practice the two summations are truncated at some appropriate (nite) lag k.
The framework we follow in order to account for time-variation in the variance and skewness
has a long pedigree in statistics, starting with the work of Priestley (1965), who introduced the
concept of slowly varying process. This work suggests that time series may have time-varying
spectral densities which change slowly over time, and proposed to describe those changes as the
result of a non-parametric process. This work has more recently been followed up by Dahlhaus
(1996), as well as Kapetanios (2007) and Giraitis et al. (2014) in the context of time-varying
regression models and economic forecasting, respectively. Specically, the time-varying variance
and skewness are calculated as
2t = V art (yt) =
tX
j=1
!j;t (yj   t)2 ;
%t = Skewt (yt) =
(
tX
j=1
!j;t (yj   t)2
) 3=2( tX
j=1
!j;t (yj   t)3
)
;
42The rst expression computes the variance as the Newey-West variance of the squared residuals, in order
to account for the autocorrelation of the errors. The second equality follows from Gasser (1975) and Psaradakis
and Sola (2003).
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where t =
Pt
j=1 !j;tyj. Thus, the sample moments are discounted by the function !t;T :
!j;t = cK

t  j
H

;
where c is an integration constant and K
 
T t
H

is the kernel function determining the weight
of each observation j in the estimation at time t. This weight depends on the distance to t
normalized by the bandwidth H. Giraitis et al. (2014) show that the estimator has desirable
frequentist properties. They suggest using Gaussian kernels with the optimal bandwidth value
H = T 1=2.
Similarly, we can compute the time-varying standard deviation of variance and skewness
estimates using time-varying estimates of the sample autocovariance and autocorrelations:
 ;t =
t j jX
j=1
!j;t
 
yj j j   t

(yj   t) ;
 ;t =
 ;t
2t
:
Based on this, Figure B1 reports time-varying measures of volatility and skewness of GDP
growth. The left panel conrms the widely documented decline in volatility. From the right
panel, it is clear that skewness drops in the second subsample, with a rst drop being identied
after the 1991 recession and a further one after the Great Recession.
Figure B1. Time-varying volatility and skewness
Notes. Figure B1 reports the time-varying variance and skewness of year-on-year growth of real
GDP (solid-blue lines) obtained by using a nonparametric estimator in the spirit of Giraitis et
al. (2014) as well as the associated 68% condence interval (dashed-blue lines). We also report
the variance and skewness of real GDP growth computed over the pre- and post-Great Moderation
sample (solid-green lines), as well as the associated 68% condence interval (dashed-green lines).
The vertical shadowed bands denote the NBER recession episodes. Sample: 1947:I-2016:II. The rst
10 years of data are dropped to initialize the algorithm. Data source: FRED.
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B2. Normality tests
Table B1. Normality tests
GDP growth (QoQ)
1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II
KS 0.638 0.002
AD 0.534 0.000
SW 0.507 0.000
JB 0.50 0.001
GDP growth (YoY)
1947:I-1984:II 1984:III-2016:II
KS 0.289 0.004
AD 0.060 0.000
SW 0.091 0.000
JB 0.50 0.001
Notes. Table B1 reports the p-values of a battery of tests assuming the null hypothesis that real
GDP growth is normally distributed in a given sample. KS refers to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with
estimated parameters (see Liliefors, 1967); AD refers to the test of Anderson and Darling (1954);
SW refers to the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) with p-values calculated as outlined
by Royston (1992); JB refers to the Jarque-Bera test for normality (Jarque and Bera, 1987). Data
source: FRED.
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B3. Additional evidence on the standardized violence of the US
business cycle
Table B2. Standardized violence of U.S. recessions (Robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1953:II 1954:II 0.635 1.127 0.734 0.731 0.599 0.664 0.584
1957:III 1958:II 1.629 2.415 1.572 1.767 1.716 1.688 1.785
1960:II 1961:I 0.351 0.595 0.387 0.429 0.307 0.464 0.304
1969:IV 1970:IV 0.163 0.156 0.101 0.248 0.155 0.240 0.158
1973:IV 1975:I 0.662 0.836 0.544 0.847 0.542 0.833 0.509
1980:I 1980:III 0.999 1.454 0.947 1.239 0.972 1.234 0.863
1981:III 1982:IV 0.598 0.885 0.576 0.645 0.448 0.621 0.400
1990:III 1991:I 1.910 1.527 1.132 1.363 1.255 1.229 1.301
2001:I 2001:IV 0.730 0.730 0.541 0.755 0.463 0.701 0.419
2007:IV 2009:II 1.847 1.665 1.234 2.020 1.607 1.915 1.571
Average
Pre-84 0.720 1.067 0.695 0.844 0.677 0.821 0.657
Post-84 1.495 1.307 0.969 1.380 1.108 1.282 1.0967
Notes: Table B2 reports di¤erent measures of standardized violence that change depending on the
business cycle volatility employed in the denominator. Column (1) follows the same procedure
employed to obtain standardized violence in Table 3, though the volatility measure is retrieved from
quarter-on-quarter growth rates of real GDP. In the remaining computations, even column numbers
report violence statistics that are standardized by volatility measures retrieved from quarter-on-
quarter growth rates or real GDP, while in odd column numbers the standardization is operated
through volatility measures obtained from year-on-year growth rates. Columns (2) and (3) calculate
the volatility by splitting the data between pre- and post-Great Moderation. In columns (4) and
(5) the standardization is operated by considering the following stochastic volatility model for real
GDP growth: yt = 0 + 1yt 1 + 2yt 2 + t"t, where 
2
t = 
2
t 1 + 
2
t
 
"2t   1

and "t  N (0; 1).
In columns (6) and (7) the standardization is operated by considering a time-varying AR model for
real GDP growth with stochastic volatility similar to that of Stock and Watson (2005), where all
the time-varying parameters follow random walk laws of motion (as in Delle Monache and Petrella,
2017). Data source: NBER.
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B4. Leverage and asymmetry (G7 countries)
Figure B2. Leverage and asymmetry: G7 countries
Households
Firms
Notes: The top panels refer to the household sector, while the bottom panels refer to the corporate
sector. The left panel of each line reports the skewness of GDP growth, computed for each G7 coun-
try, against the loan-to-GDP ratio of a specic sector. In the right panels we replace the skewness
with the ratio between the downside and the upside semivolatility of business uctuations. The
regression line is obtained by assuming a quadratic relationship between the two variables (account-
ing for sector-specic xed e¤ects). Data source: OECD and Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory
Database.
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B5. Household leverage in the US
Figure B3. U.S. States ordered by householdsaverage debt-to-income ratio
Notes. U.S. States ordered by the average debt-to-income ratio in the household sector, over the
period 2003-2007. Data source: State Level Household Debt Statistics produced by the New York
Fed.
Appendix C. Details on the solution of the two-period
model
Here, we provide details on the computation of the competitive equilibrium of the two-period
model discussed in Section 3. The notation is explained in the main text.
Optimality
We rst derive the optimality conditions. Rewrite the maximand with the budget constraints
and the denition of capital accumulation to get
eU = log rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0
+ log
 
1 + rK2

K1 +W2  RB1

:
We maximize eU w.r.t. K1 and B1, subject to (5). Factor payments are taken as given, as these
are co-determined by the demands of all rms in the economy.
We get the rst-order conditions
  1
rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0
+ 
1 + rK2
(1 + rK2 )K1 +W2  RB1
+ 
s
R
= 0; (31)
1
rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0
   R
(1 + rK2 )K1 +W2  RB1
   = 0; (32)


B1   sK1
R

= 0;   0; (33)
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where  is the multiplier applying to the collateral constraint.
Otherwise, the production factors are remunerated at their marginal product:
rKt = AtK
 1
t 1 L
1 
t ; (34)
Wt = (1  )AtKt 1L t ; t = 1; 2: (35)
The case of an equilibrium with a non-binding constraint
In this case,  = 0, so that (31) and (32) become
1
C1
= 
1 + rK2
C2
;
1
C1
= 
R
C2
;
and no-arbitrage implies
1 + rK2 = R: (36)
This pins down K1 from (34):
K1 =

A
R  1
 1
1 
: (37)
From (35) we can also recover the wage rate in period 2:
W2 = (1  )A

A
R  1
 
1 
: (38)
Thus, total income amounts to
 
1 + rK2

K1 +W2 =
1


A
R  1
 1
1 
( +R  1) ;
so that we retrieve
C2 =   RB1; (39)
where    1


A
R 1
 1
1  ( +R  1). Plugging (39) into (32), together with (2), returns
1
rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0| {z }
= C1
= 
R
  RB1 ;
and, therefore:
  RB1 = R

rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0

:
Plugging in the solutions for W1, rK1 and K1 results into
  RB1 = R
"
A1K

0  RB0 +B1  

A
R  1
 1
1 
+ (1  )K0
#
;
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from which we can characterize B1 as
B1 =
 
R (1 + )
  
1 + 
"
A1K

0  RB0  

A
R  1
 1
1 
+ (1  )K0
#
: (40)
We can then derive I1, C1 and C2. We have, by solution of K1, that
I1 =

A
R  1
 1
1 
  (1  )K0: (41)
We nd C2 by combining (40) with (39):
C2 =
 
1 + 
+
R
1 + 
"
A1K

0  RB0  

A
R  1
 1
1 
+ (1  )K0
#
:
Finally, using 1=C1 = R=C2 in the unconstrained case, we get
C1 =
 
R (1 + )
+
1
1 + 
"
A1K

0  RB0  

A
R  1
 1
1 
+ (1  )K0
#
:
The case of a binding constraint
In this case,  > 0. We rst use (31) and (32):
  1
C1
+ 
1 + rK2
C2
+ 
s
R
= 0; (42)
1
C1
   R
C2
   = 0: (43)
Adding the left- and the right-hand side terms gives

1 + rK2  R
C2
= 

1  s
R

> 0: (44)
This shows how a binding borrowing constraint induces a wedge between the return on bor-
rowing and capital; i.e., (36) ceases to hold. Specically, investment is depressed, which drives
the gross marginal return of capital above R.
C2 depends on K1 andW2 as before, but B1 and K1 are now linked by the credit constraint.
However, rK2 does not pin down K1 as in the unconstrained case, as  > 0; cf. (44). Using (42)
and (43) eliminate :
1
C1
= 
1 + rK2   s
C2
 
1  s
R
 :
Thus, using (2) and (3):
1
rK1 K0 +W1  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0
= 
1 + rK2   s
[(1 + rK2 )K1 +W2  RB1]
 
1  s
R
 :
We can now use the expressions for rK1 ; r
K
2 ;W1 and W2 to get
1
A1K0  RB0 +B1  K1 + (1  )K0
= 
1 + AK 11   s
[K1 + AK1  RB1]
 
1  s
R
 :
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Finally, we use the binding credit constraint,
B1 = s
K1
R
;
to eliminate B1:
1
A1K0  RB0  
 
1  s
R

K1 + (1  )K0
= 
1 + AK 11   s
[(1  s)K1 + AK1 ]
 
1  s
R
 : (45)
This provides a non-linear characterization of K1 (and, thus, investment). The expression
above can be reshu­ ed to get
	 (K1;A1) = 0;
where
	 (K1;A1)  
 
1 + AK 11   s
 h
A1K

0  RB0  

1  s
R

K1 + (1  )K0
i
  [(1  s)K1 + AK1 ]

1  s
R

:
Appendix D. Details on the design and solution of the
DSGE model
This appendix reports further information on the design and solution of the DSGE model.
We rst provide some details on the modeling and calibration of the debt contracts. We then
proceed to state the rst-order conditions, the steady state, and the log-linearization of the
model.
D1. Debt contracts
Impatient households and entrepreneurs take up debt with maturity greater than one period.
The borrowing constraints presented in the main text, (18) and (24), are rationalized in line
with Kydland et al. (2016). Let Lit denote the ow of lending to agent i = fI; Eg in period t.
This consists of two elements: Agent is share of existing, non-amortized debt that is renanced
in period t, #i(1  i)Bit 1, and new netlending, Li;nett . Thus:
Lit = L
i;net
t + #
i(1  i)Bit 1: (46)
The ow of lending is related to the stock of debt via the following law of motion:
Bit =
 
1  #i  1  iBit 1 + Lit; (47)
or, using (46):
Bit =
 
1  iBit 1 + Li;nett :
When taking on new debt, borrowers can pledge as collateral only the fraction of their assets
not already used to secure the existing stock of debt. Since #i denotes the fraction of existing
debt that is renanced, the remaining share 1   #i of existing debt is collateralized by the
same fraction of the borrowers assets. This implies the upper bounds on new lending, for each
agent:
LIt  #IsIt
Et fQt+1gHIt
Rt
;
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LEt  #EsEt Et

QKt+1Kt +Qt+1H
E
t
Rt

:
Combining these two expressions with the law of motion for debt, (47), we obtain the borrowing
constraints presented in the main text:
BIt  #IsIt
Et fQt+1gHIt
Rt
+
 
1  #I  1  IBIt 1;
BEt  #EsEt Et

QKt+1Kt +Qt+1H
E
t
Rt

+
 
1  #E  1  EBEt 1:
Steady state and calibration of the debt contracts
It is useful to introduce it (for i = fI; Eg) to denote the fraction of total lending that goes
into the renancing of old debt. From (46), it follows that:
it 
Lit   Li;nett
Lit
= #i(1  i)B
i
t 1
Lit
:
In the steady state, this becomes:
i = #i(1  i)B
i
Li
:
We can obtain an expression for B
i
Li
from the steady-state version of the debt-accumulation
equation (47):
Bi
Li
=
1
1   1  #i  1  i ;
which can be inserted into the previous expression to obtain:
i =
#i(1  i)
1   1  #i  1  i :
This pins down the steady-state value of the renancing parameter, #i, for given values of the
amortization rate, i, and the share of renancing to total loans, i. Solving for #i, we obtain:
#i =
ii
(1  i)  1  i : (48)
As discussed in Section 5.1.1, this expression is employed in our calibration strategy: For both
household and corporate debt, we set empirical values of i and i. We then use (48) to calibrate
the renancing parameter for each of the two agents. For households, we set I = 0:014 and
I = 0:39, thus obtaining #I = 0:009. For rms, we set I = 0:125 and I = 0:83, so that
#I = 0:698.
D2. First-order conditions
Here we report the rst-order conditions from the optimization problems faced by the three
types of agents in the model.
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Patient households
Patient householdsoptimal behavior is described by the following rst-order conditions:
1
CPt   PCPt 1
  
P
Et

CPt+1
	  PCPt = Pt ; (49)
P
 
1 NPt
 'P
= Pt W
P
t ; (50)
Pt = 
PRtEt

Pt+1
	
; (51)
Qt =
"t
Pt H
P
t
+ PEt
(
Pt+1
Pt
Qt+1
)
; (52)
where Pt is the multiplier associated with (15).
Impatient households
The rst-order conditions of the impatient households are given by:
1
CIt   ICIt 1
  
I
Et

CIt+1
	  ICIt = It ; (53)
I
 
1 N It
 'I
= ItW
I
t ; (54)
It   It = IRtEt

It+1
	  I  1  #I  1  IEt It+1	 ; (55)
Qt =
"t
ItH
I
t
+ IEt
(
It+1
It
Qt+1
)
+ #IsIt
It
It
Et fQt+1g
Rt
; (56)
where It is the multiplier associated with (17), and 
I
t is the multiplier associated with (18).
Additionally, the complementary slackness condition
It

BIt   #IsIt
Et fQt+1gHIt
Rt
   1  #I  1  IBIt 1 = 0; (57)
must hold along with It  0 and (18).
Entrepreneurs
The optimal behavior of the entrepreneurs is characterized by:
1
CEt   ECEt 1
  
E
Et

CEt+1
	  ECEt = Et ; (58)
Et   Et = ERtEt

Et+1
	  E  1  #E  1  EEt Et+1	 ; (59)
Et =  
E
t
"
1  

2

It
It 1
  1
2
  
 It
It 1

It
It 1
  1
#
+ E
Et
(
 Et+1

It+1
It
2
It+1
It
  1
)
;
(60)
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 Et = 
ErKt Et

Et+1
	
+ E (1  )Et

 Et+1
	
+ #EEt s
E
t
Et

QKt+1
	
Rt
; (61)
Qt = 
ErHt Et
(
Et+1
Et
)
+ EEt
(
Et+1
Et
Qt+1
)
+ #EsEt
Et
Et
Et fQt+1g
Rt
; (62)
where Et ,  
E
t , and 
E
t are the multipliers associated with (22), (23), and (24), respectively.
Moreover,
Et

BEt   #EsEt Et

QKt+1Kt +Qt+1H
E
t
Rt

   1  #E  1  EBEt 1 = 0; (63)
holds along with Et  0 and (24). Finally, the denition of QKt implies that
QKt =  
E
t =
E
t : (64)
Firms
Firmsrst-order conditions determine the optimal demand for the input factors:
Yt=N
P
t = W
P
t ; (65)
(1  ) Yt=N It = W It ; (66)
(1  ) (1  )Et fYt+1g =Kt = rKt ; (67)
(1  )Et fYt+1g =HEt = rHt : (68)
D3. Steady state
The deterministic steady state of the model is described in the following. Variables without
time subscripts indicate their steady-state values. We rst consider the implications of the
patient householdsoptimality conditions. From (49) and (50), we get
1  P P 
1  P CP = P (69)
and
P
 
1 NP  'P = PW P ; (70)
respectively. The steady-state gross interest rate on loans is recovered from (51):
R =
1
P
; (71)
emphasizing that it is the time preference of the most patient individual that determines the
steady-state rate of interest. From (52) we nd
HP =
"
QP
 
1  P  : (72)
Turning to impatient households, (53) and (54) lead to
1  II 
1  ICI = I ; (73)
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and
I
 
1 N I 'I = IW I ; (74)
respectively. From (55) we obtain the steady-state value of the multiplier on the credit con-
straint:
I =
I
 
1  IR
1  I  1  #I  1  I ;
which, by use of (71), yields
I =
I

1  I
P

1  I  1  #I  1  I : (75)
From (75) we see that, in the steady state, I > 0 provided that P > I , which implies that
the credit constraint (18) is binding. In a similar fashion, from (59) we get
E =
E

1  E
P

1  E  1  #E  1  E : (76)
Hence, E > 0 provided that P > E, implying that the entrepreneurscredit constraint,
(24), is also binding in the steady state. From (56) we get
HI =
"
QI

1  I  

1  I
P

1 I(1 #I)(1 I)#
IsIP
 ; (77)
where the last line makes use of (71) and (75).
Turning to the remaining optimality conditions of the entrepreneurs, (58) gives
1  EE 
1  ECE = E; (78)
and (60) implies
 E
"
1  

2

I
I
  1
2#
   E
I
I

I
I
  1

+ E E


I
I
2
I
I
  1

= E;
leading to
 E = E: (79)
This reects that there are no investment adjustment costs in the steady state. Therefore, the
shadow value of a unit of capital equals the shadow value of wealth. Combining (79) with (64),
we obtain
QK = 1: (80)
After imposing (71), (76), and (79), (61) returns
rK =

1  E  1  #E  1  E 1  E (1  )   P   E#EsEQK
E

1  E  1  #E  1  E : (81)
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From (62), instead, we nd
rH =
 
1  EQ
E
  
E#EsE
EE
Q
R
: (82)
We then turn to the remaining equilibrium conditions in the steady state. As we saw above,
the two credit constraints are binding in the steady state. Hence,
BI =
#IsI
1   1  #I  1  IQHIR ; (83)
BE =
#EsE
1   1  #E  1  EQKK +QHER : (84)
The production function is
Y =
h 
NP
  
N I
1 i h 
HE

K1 
i1 
: (85)
The steady-state counterparts of rmsrst-order conditions, (65)(68), are:

Y
NP
= W P ; (86)
(1  )  Y
N I
= W I ; (87)
(1  ) (1  ) Y
K
= rK ; (88)
(1  ) Y
HE
= rH : (89)
In the steady state, the law of motion for capital implies
I = K: (90)
We have the following steady-state resource constraints:
Y = CP + CI + CE + I; (91)
H = HP +HI +HE; (92)
BP +BI +BE = 0: (93)
Also, we have the steady-state versions of the agentsbudget constraints:
CP = W PNP   (R  1)BP ; (94)
CI = W IN I   (R  1)BI ; (95)
CE + I = rKK + rHHE   (R  1)BE (96)
We therefore have that the steady state is characterized by the vector
Y;CP ; CI ; CE; I;HP ; HI ; HE; K;NP ; N I ; BP ; BI ; BE;
Q;QK ; R; rK ; rH ;W P ;W I ; P ; I ; E; I ; E;  E

:
These 27 variables are determined by the 27 equations: (69), (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75),
(76), (77), (78), (79), (80), (81), (82), (83), (84), (85), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92),
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(93), (94), and (95).
We now briey proceed with the characterization of the steady state, nding some vari-
ablesequilibrium in a closed form. To this end, we dene these variables as a ratio of total
output. The resulting system, which comprises seven equations, is then solved numerically.
The remaining variables then follow from the characterizations above.
First, combine (81) and (88) to get an expression for capital-output ratio:
K
Y
=
(1  ) (1  ) E 1  E  1  #E  1  E
1  E  1  #E  1  E 1  E (1  )   P   E#EsEQK ; (97)
where we have used QK = 1 from (80). Thus, we combine (82) and (89) to get an expression
for entrepreneursland-output ratio:
QHE
Y
=
(1  )E 1  E  1  #E  1  E 
1  E 1  E  1  #E  1  E   P   E#EsE ; (98)
where we have made use of (76). Again, based on QK = 1, the entrepreneurial borrowing
constraint can be rewritten as
BE
Y
=
#E
1   1  #E  1  E sER

K
Y
+
QHE
Y

; (99)
where we can insert from (71), (97), and (98). The resulting closed-form solution of the
entrepreneurial steady-state loan-to-output ratio is central in setting up a sub-system of seven
central variables. First, it can be plugged into the entrepreneursbudget constraint, (96), so
as to obtain:
CE
Y
+
I
Y
= rK
K
Y
+ rH
HE
Y
  (R  1) B
E
Y
;
which, by use of (90), becomes
CE
Y
=
 
rK    K
Y
+ rH
HE
Y
  (R  1) B
E
Y
:
Using (81) and (89), we get
CE
Y
=
  
1  E 1  E  1  #E  1  E   P   E#EsEQK
E

1  E  1  #E  1  E
!
K
Y
+(1  ) (R  1) B
E
Y
;
which, by use of (97), returns the entrepreneursconsumption-to-output ratio:
CE
Y
=
(1  ) (1  )  1  E 1  E  1  #E  1  E   P   E#EsE
1  E  1  #E  1  E 1  E (1  )   P   E#EsE (100)
+ (1  )  1  
P
P
BE
Y
:
We then turn to the impatient households. Their budget constraint can be written as
CI
Y
=
W IN I
Y
  (R  1) B
I
Y
;
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which, by use of (71) and (87), becomes
CI
Y
= (1  )    1  
P
P
BI
Y
:
Likewise, patient householdsbudget constraint can be written as
CP
Y
=
W PNP
Y
  (R  1) B
P
Y
;
which, by use of (71) and (86), becomes
CP
Y
=    1  
P
P
BP
Y
:
Adding up these constraints gives
CI + CP
Y
=  +
1  P
P
BE
Y
; (101)
where (93) has been invoked. Note that the right-hand-side of (101) is known, by virtue of
(99).
Combining (69), (70) and (86) gives the steady-state equilibrium condition for patient
householdslabor:
P
 
1 NP  'P CP 1  P
1  P P = 
Y
NP
: (102)
Similarly, (73), (74) and (87) characterize impatient householdsequilibrium labor:
I
 
1 N I 'I CI 1  I
1  II = (1  ) 
Y
N I
: (103)
Combining the two householdsland-demand expressions, (72) and (77), gives
HI
HP
=
P
 
1  P  1  I  1  #I  1  I
I
 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI	 :
Eliminating the multipliers by (69) and (73), and eliminating HP through (92), we obtain the
following land-market equilibrium characterization:
HI
H  HI  HE
CP
CI
=
 
1  P P   1  I  1  P  1  I  1  #I  1  I 
1  II  1  P   1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI	 :
(104)
We also take the impatient householdsborrowing constraint into consideration. Using (83) to
eliminate BI in the budget constraint,
CI
Y
= (1  )     1  P  #I
1   1  #I  1  I sIQHIY : (105)
67
Relying on (77),
QHI =
"

1  I  1  #I  1  I
I
 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI	 ;
and, again, (73), we obtain
QHI =
"

1  I  1  #I  1  I (1 I)
1 IIC
I 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI ; (106)
Q =
"

1  I  1  #I  1  I (1 I)
1 IIC
I
HI
 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI	 : (107)
We then use (106) to rewrite the consumption-output ratio for impatient households, (105), as
CI
Y
= (1  ) 
   1  P  #I
1   1  #I  1  I sIY "

1  I  1  #I  1  I (1 I)
1 IIC
I 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI :
(108)
Likewise, we can use (107) to eliminate Q from (98), and obtain:
HE
Y
=
(1  )E 1  E  1  #E  1  E 
1  E 1  E  1  #E  1  E   P   E#EsE  (109)

 
1  I 1  I  1  #I  1  I   P   I#IsI	
"

1  I  1  #I  1  I (1 I)
1 II
HI
CI
:
Thus, the production function (85) is rewritten as a function of the derived ratios:
Y  = A
h 
NP
  
N I
1 i "HE
Y

K
Y
1 #1 
;
Using (97), we nally obtain
Y = A
1

 
NP
  
N I
1  

24HE
Y
 (1  ) (1  ) E 1  E  1  #E  1  E
1  E  1  #E  1  E 1  E (1  )   P   E#EsEQK
!1 35
1 

:
(110)
We have now reduced the steady state to a matter of nding the vector
Y;CP ; CI ; HI ; HE; NP ; N I

;
which satises the equations (101), (102), (103), (104), (108), (109) and (110), given the
solution for BE=Y , (99), and given all the parameters and exogenous variables of the model.
We compute the vector numerically using fsolve in Matlab. The remaining variables then
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follow analytically from the steady-state equations presented above.
D4. Log-linearization
We log-linearize the model around the steady state found in the previous section. In the
following, we let cXt denote the log-deviation of a generic variable Xt from its steady state
value X, except for the following variables: For the interest rates, bRt  Rt R, brHt  rHt   rH
and brKt  rKt   rK ; for debt, bBit  (Bit  Bi) =Y , i = fP; I; Eg. We rst derive the log-linear
versions of the agents optimality conditions and conclude with the expressions for market
clearing.
Optimality Conditions of Patient Households
Once log-linearized, equations (49), (50) and (51) become
P PEt
n bCPt+1o  1 + P  P 2 bCPt + P bCPt 1 =  1  P   1  P P  bPt ; (111)
'P
NP
1 NP
bNPt = bPt +cW Pt ; (112)
P bRt + Et nbPt+1o = bPt ; (113)
Log-linearizing (52) yields
"
HP
b"t   bHPt + PPQEt nbPt+1 + bQt+1o = PQbPt + bQt :
Now use steady-state equation (72) to get
 QP  1  P  bHPt +QP  1  P b"t + PPQEt nbPt+1 + bQt+1o = PQbPt + bQt ;
and thereby
PEt
nbPt+1 + bQt+1o   1  P  bHPt +  1  P b"t = bPt + bQt: (114)
Moreover, the log-linearized budget constraint reads as
CP
Y
bCPt + QHPY  bHPt   bHPt 1+ BPY bRt 1 + 1P bBPt 1
= bBPt +  cW Pt + bNPt  :
where we have used (86).
Optimality Conditions of Impatient Households
From (53), (54) and (55) we obtain
IIEt
n bCIt+1o  1 + I  I2 bCIt + I bCIt 1 =  1  I  1  II bIt ; (115)
'I
N I
1 N I
bN It = bIt +cW It ; (116)
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and
IbIt   IbIt = II bRt + IRIEt nbIt+1o  I  1  #I  1  IIEt bIt+1	 ;
respectively. The last expression is rewritten, by means of (75), as
bIt = I bRt + IREt nbIt+1o+

1  I
P

1  I  1  #I  1  IbIt (117)
 I  1  #I  1  I

1  I
P

1  I  1  #I  1  IEt bIt+1	 :
Furthermore, (56) becomes
Q bQt = "
HII
b"t   bIt   bHIt + IQEt nbIt+1 + bQt+1   bIto
+
I
I
#IsIQ
R
hbIt   bIt + bst + Et n bQt+1o  P bRti ;
which, by use of (75) and (77), becomes
bQt = "1  I    P   I
1  I  1  #I  1  I#IsI
#b"t   bIt   bHIt + IEt nbIt+1 + bQt+1   bIto
+
 
P   I
1  I  1  #I  1  I#IsI
hbIt   bIt + bst + Et n bQt+1o  P bRti ; (118)
where, again, we have used (71). The budget constraint becomes
CI
Y
bCIt + QHIY  bHIt   bHIt 1+ BIY bRM;It 1 + 1P bBIt 1 = bBIt + (1  ) 
cW It + bN It  ; (119)
where we have used (87). Finally, the log-linearized version of the collateral constraint is:
Y bBIt  #IsIQHIR bsIt + Et n bQt+1o+ bHIt   P bRt+  1  #I  1  IY bBIt 1: (120)
Optimality Conditions of the Entrepreneurs
From (58) and (59) we get
EEEt
n bCEt+1o  1 + E  E2 bCEt + E bCEt 1 =  1  E  1  EE bEt ; (121)
EbEt   EbEt = EE bRt + EREEt nbEt+1o  E  1  #E  1  EEEt bEt+1	 ;
respectively. The latter we can be rewritten using (76):
bEt = E bRt + EREt nbEt+1o+

1  E
P

1  E  1  #E  1  EbEt (122)
 E  1  #E  1  E

1  E
P

1  E  1  #E  1  EEt bEt+1	 :
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From (60) we get
b Et   
  1 + E bIt + 
bIt 1 + E
Et nbIt+1o = bEt ; (123)
where we have made use of (79). Equation (61) becomes
b Et = ErKEt nbEt+1o+ EbrKt + E (1  )Et nb Et+1o
+#E
 
P   E
1  E  1  #E  1  EsEQK
hbEt + bsEt + Et n bQKt+1o  P bRti ; (124)
where we have used (71), (76), and (79). Moreover, (64) becomes
b Et = bEt + bQKt : (125)
Finally, (62) is approximated as
Q bQt = ErH Et nbEt+1o  bEt + 1rH brHt

+ EQ

Et
nbEt+1o+ Et n bQt+1o  bEt 
+#EsE
E
E
Q
R
hbsEt + bEt   bEt + Et n bQt+1o  P bRti ;
which we can rewrite, using (71) and (76), as
Q bQt = ErH Et nbEt+1o  bEt + 1rH brHt

+ EQEt
bEt+1 + bQt+1   bEt 
+
 
P   E
1  E  1  #E  1  E#EsEQ
hbsEt + bEt   bEt + Et n bQt+1o  P bRti :(126)
Furthermore, the budget constraint becomes
CE
Y
bCEt + IY bIt + QHEY  bHEt   bHEt 1+ BEY bRM;Et 1 + 1P bBEt 1
= bBEt + KY brKt 1 + HEY brHt 1 + (1  ) bHEt 1 + (1  ) (1  ) bKt 1; (127)
where we have used (88) and (89). Finally, the borrowing constraint reads as
Y bBEt  #EsE  K +QHER bsEt   P bRt+ #EsEKREt n bQKt+1 + bKto (128)
+#EsE
QHE
R
Et
n bQt+1 + bHEt o+  1  #E  1  EY bBEt 1:
FirmsOptimality Conditions
Firmsrst-order conditions, (65), (66), (67) and (68), are log-linearized as
bYt   bNPt = cW Pt ; (129)bYt   bN It = cW It ; (130)
Et
nbYt+1o  bKt =  rK 1 brKt ; (131)
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Et
nbYt+1o  bHEt =  rH 1 brHt ; (132)
respectively.
Market Clearing and Resource Constraints
From the law of motion for capital, (23), we get
bKt = (1  ) bKt 1 + bIt; (133)
where we have used (90). Moreover, from the resource constraint, (30), we have
bYt = CP
Y
bCPt + CIY bCIt + CEY bCEt + KY bIt: (134)
We also have the log-linearized versions of (26), (28) and (29):
bYt = bAt +  bNPt + (1  )  bN It + (1  ) (1  ) bKt 1 + (1  ) bHEt 1; (135)
0 = HP bHPt +HI bHIt +HE bHEt ; (136)
0 = bBPt + bBIt + bBEt : (137)
As for the shocks processes, (27), (14) and (19) imply
bAt = A bAt 1 + zt; (138)
b"t = "b"t 1 + ut; (139)bst = sbst 1 + vt; (140)
respectively. This completes our list of log-linearized equations.
The log-linearized system consists of 30 equations: 18 rst-order conditions, 2 budget con-
straints, 2 credit constraints, 1 production function, 3 market clearing conditions, 1 capital
accumulation equation, and 3 shock processes. The 30 variables of the system are given by the
vector " bCPt ; bCIt ; bCEt ; bPt ; bIt ; bEt ; b Et ; bIt ; bEt ; bRt; bNPt ; bN It ;cW Pt ;cW It ;bHPt ; bHIt ; bHEt ; bQt; bQKt ; brHt ; brKt ; bKt; bIt; bYt; bBPt ; bBIt ; bBEt ; bAt;b"t; bst
#
;
and are determined by equations (111)-(140).
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Appendix E. Solution method
We solve the model numerically, as described in the following. When solving the model, we treat
the collateral constraints as inequalities, accounting for two complementary slackness conditions
(57) and (63). We then adopt the solution method of Holden and Paetz (2012), on which this
appendix builds. In turn, Holden and Paetz (2012) expand on previous work by Laséen and
Svensson (2011). With rst-order perturbations, this solution method is equivalent to the
piecewise linear approach discussed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). We have veried that
their proposed solution method does indeed produce identical results. Furthermore, Holden
and Paetz (2012) and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) evaluate the accuracy of their respective
methods against a global solution based on projection methods. This is done for a very simple
model with a borrowing constraint, for which a highly accurate global solution can be obtained
and used as a benchmark. They nd that the local approximations are very accurate. For the
model used in this paper, the large number of state variables (14 endogenous state variables
and three shocks) renders the use of global solution methods impractical due to the curse of
dimensionality typically associated with such methods.
The collateral constraints put an upper bound on the borrowing of each of the two con-
strained agents. While the constraints are binding in the steady state, this may not be the
case outside the steady state, where the constraints may not bind. Observe that we can re-
formulate the collateral constraints in terms of restrictions on each agents shadow value of
borrowing; jt ; j = fI; Eg: We know that jt  0 if and only if the optimal debt level of agent
j is exactly at or above the collateral value. In other words, we need to ensure that jt  0. If
this restriction is satised with inequality, the constraint is binding, so the slackness condition
is satised. If it holds with equality, the collateral constraint becomes non-binding, but the
slackness condition is still satised. If instead jt < 0, agent js optimal level of debt is lower
than the credit limit, so that treating his collateral constraint as an equality implies that we
are forcing him to borrow too much. In this case, the slackness condition is violated. We then
need to add shadow price shocks so as to pushjt back up until it exactly equals its lower
limit of zero and the slackness condition is satised. To ensure compatibility with rational
expectations, these shocks are added to the model as news shocks. The idea of adding such
shocks to the model derives from Laséen and Svensson (2011), who use such an approach to
deal with pre-announced paths for the interest rate setting of a central bank. The contribution
of Holden and Paetz (2012) is to develop a numerical method to compute the size of these
shocks that are required to obtain the desired level for a given variable in each period, and to
make this method applicable to a general class of potentially more complicated problems than
the relatively simple experiments conducted by Laséen and Svensson (2011).
We rst describe how to compute impulse responses to a single generic shock, e.g., a tech-
nology shock. The rst step is to add independent sets of shadow price shocks to each of the
two log-linearized collateral constraints. To this end, we need to determine the number of
periods T for which we conjecture that the collateral constraints may be non-binding. This
number may be smaller than or equal to the number of periods for which we compute impulse
responses; T  T IRF . For each period t  T , we then add shadow price shocks which hit the
economy in period t but become known at period 0, that is, at the same time the economy is
hit by the technology shock.
LetcXt denote the log-deviation of a generic variableXt from its steady-state valueX, except
for the following variables: For the interest rates, bRt  Rt R, brHt  rHt  rH and brKt  rKt  rK ,
and for debt, bBit  (Bit  Bi) =Y , i = P; I; E. We can then write the log-linearized collateral
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constraints, augmented with the shadow price shocks, as follows:
Y bBIt  #IsIQHIR bsIt + Et n bQt+1o+ bHIt   P bRt+  1  #I  1  IY bBIt 1  
T 1X
s=0
"SP;Is;t s;
Y bBEt  #EsE  K +QHER bsEt   P bRt+ #EsEKREt n bQKt+1 + bKto
+#EsE
QHE
R
Et
n bQt+1 + bHEt o+  1  #E  1  EY bBEt 1   T 1X
s=0
"SP;Es;t s;
where "SP;js;t s is the shadow price shock that hits agent j in period t = s, and is anticipated by
all agents in period t = t   s = 0 ensuring consistency with rational expectations. We let all
shadow price shocks be of unit magnitude. We then need to compute two sets of weights I
and E to control the impact of each shock on 
I
t and 
E
t . The optimalsets of weights ensure
that It and 
E
t are bounded below at exactly zero. The weights are computed by solving the
following quadratic programming problem:
 
h
0I 
0
E
i0
= arg min
h
0I 
0
E
i " I + eI;A
E + eE;A

+
 eI;"SP;I eI;"SP;EeE;"SP;I eE;"SP;E

I
E
#
;
subject to
0j  0;
j + ej;A + ej;"SP;jj + ej;"SP;kk  0;
j = fI; Eg. Here, j and ej;A denote, respectively, the steady-state value and the unrestricted
relative impulse response of j to a technology shock, that is, the impulse-response of j when
the collateral constraints are assumed to always bind. In this respect, the vector

I + eI;A
E + eE;A

contains the absolute, unrestricted impulse responses of the two shadow values stacked. Further,
each matrix ej;"SP;k contains the relative impulse responses of j to shadow price shocks to
agent ks constraint for j; k = fI; Eg, in the sense that column s in ej;"SP;k represents the
response of the shadow value to a shock "SP;js;t s, i.e. to a shadow price shock that hits in
period s but is anticipated at time 0, as described above.43 The o¤-diagonal elements of the
matrix
 eI;"SP;I eI;"SP;EeE;"SP;I eE;"SP;E

take into account that the impatient household may be a¤ected if
the collateral constraint of the entrepreneur becomes non-binding, and vice versa. Following
the discussion in Holden and Paetz (2012), a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a unique
solution to the optimization problem is that the matrix
 eI;"SP;I eI;"SP;EeE;"SP;I eE;"SP;E

+
 eI;"SP;I eI;"SP;EeE;"SP;I eE;"SP;E
0
is positive denite. We have checked and veried that this condition is in fact always satised.
We can explain the nature of the optimization problem as follows. First, note that j +ej;A + ej;"SP;jj + ej;"SP;kk denotes the combined response of jt to a given shock (here, a
43Each matrix ej;"SP;k needs to be a square matrix, so if the number of periods in which we guess the
constraints may be non-binding is smaller than the number of periods for which we compute impulse responses,
T < T IRF , we use only the rst T rows of the matrix, i.e., the upper square matrix.
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technology shock) and a simultaneous announcement of a set of future shadow price shocks
for a given set of weights. Given the constraints of the problem, the objective is to nd a
set of optimal weights so that the impact of the (non-negative) shadow-price shocks is exactly
large enough to make sure that the response of jt is never negative. The minimization ensures
that the impact of the shadow price shocks will never be larger than necessary to obtain this.
Finally, we only allow for solutions for which the value of the objective function is zero. This
ensures that at any given horizon, positive shadow price shocks occur if and only if at least one
of the two constrained variables, It and 
E
t , are at their lower bound of zero in that period. As
pointed out by Holden and Paetz (2012), this can be thought of as a complementary slackness
condition on the two inequality constraints of the optimization problem. Once we have solved
the minimization problem, it is straightforward to compute the bounded impulse responses of
all endogenous variables by simply adding the optimally weighted shadow price shocks to the
unconstrained impulse responses of the model in each period.
We rely on the same method to compute dynamic simulations. In this case, however, we
need to allow for more than one type of shock. For each period t, we rst generate the shocks
hitting the economy. We then compute the unrestricted path of the endogenous variables given
those shocks and given the simulated values in t   1. The unrestricted paths of the bounded
variables (It and 
E
t ) then take the place of the impulse responses in the optimization problem.
If the unrestricted paths of It and 
E
t never hit the bounds in future periods, our simulation for
period t is ne. If the bounds are hit, we follow the method above and add anticipated shadow
price shocks for a su¢ cient number of future periods. We then compute restricted values for
all endogenous variables, and use these as our simulation for period t. Note that, unlike the
case for impulse responses, in our dynamic simulations not all anticipated future shadow price
shocks will eventually hit the economy, as other shocks may occur before the realization of the
expected shadow price shocks and push the restricted variables away from their bounds.
Appendix F. Data description and estimation strategy
As described in the main text, we use data for the following ve macroeconomic variables of
the U.S. economy spanning the period 1952:I1984:II: The year-on-year growth rates (in log-
di¤erences) of real GDP, real private consumption, real non-residential investment, and real
house prices, and the cyclical component of the LTA series in Figure 2, with the trend being
computed as in Müller and Watson (2018). Since the cyclical components of the two LTA series
are strongly correlated, we use the one obtained for the households.44 All data series are taken
from the Federal Reserves FRED database, with the exception of the house price, which is
provided by the US Census Bureau. The series are the following:
 Growth rate of Real Gross Domestic Product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, seasonally
adjusted, annual rate (FRED series name: GDPC1).
 Growth rate of Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, billions of chained 2009 dollars,
seasonally adjusted, annual rate (FRED series name: PCECC96).
 Growth rate of Real private xed investment: Nonresidential (chain-type quantity index),
index 2009=100, seasonally adjusted (FRED series name: B008RA3Q086SBEA).
 Growth rate of Price Index of New Single-Family Houses Sold Including Lot Value, index
2005=100, not seasonally adjusted. This series is available only from 1963:Q1 onwards.
44All results are robust to using the corporate one.
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To obtain the house price in real terms, this series is deated using the GDP dea-
tor (Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deator, index 2009=100, seasonally
adjusted, FRED series name: GDPDEF).
 LTA data: We employ the series in the right panel of Figure 2 for the period up until
1984:II. As described in Appendix A1, we extract the trend from these series using
the method of Müller and Watson (2018). We then use the cyclical component in the
estimation of the model. Since the cyclical components of the two series are strongly
correlated, we use the series for households, but all results are robust to using the series
for rms instead.
Estimation
We use 16 empirical moments in the SMM estimation: The standard deviations and rst-order
autoregressive parameters of each of the ve variables described above, the correlation of con-
sumption, investment, and house prices with output, and the skewness of output, consumption,
and investment. These moments are matched to their simulated counterparts from the theoret-
ical model. Our estimation procedure seeks to minimize the sum of squared deviations between
empirical and simulated moments. As some of the moments are measured in di¤erent units
(e.g., standard deviations vs. correlations), we use the percentage deviation from the empirical
moment in each case. In order for the minimization procedure to converge, it is crucial to use
the same set of shocks repeatedly, making sure that the only change in the simulated moments
from one iteration to the next is that arising from updating the parameter values. In practice,
since the list of parameter values to be estimated includes the variance of the shocks in the
model, we draw from the standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, and
then scale the shocks by the variance of each of the three shock processes, allowing us to esti-
mate the latter. We use a draw of 2000 realizations of each of the three shocks in the model,
thus obtaining simulated moments for 2000 periods.45 To make sure that the draw of shocks
used is representative of the underlying distribution, we make 501 draws of potential shock
matrices, rank these in terms of the standard deviations of each of the three shocks, and select
the shock matrix closest to the median along all three dimensions. This matrix of shocks is then
used in the estimation. In the estimation, we impose only very general bounds on parameter
values: All parameters are bounded below at zero, and the habit formation parameters along
with all AR(1)-coe¢ cients are bounded above at 0:99 a bound that is never attained.
To initiate the estimation procedure a set of initial values for the estimated parameters are
needed. These are chosen based on values reported in the existing literature. The estimation
results proved robust to changes in the set of initial values, as long as these remain within the
range of available estimates. In line with the existing literature, we set the initial values of
the investment adjustment cost parameter (
) and the parameters governing habit formation
in consumption for the three agents to 4 and 0:5, respectively.46 For the technology shock, we
choose values similar to those used in most of the real business cycle literature, A = 0:97 and
A = 0:005 (see, e.g., Mandelman et al., 2011). For the land-demand shock, we set " = 0:99
45Our simulated sample is thus more than 15 times longer than the actual dataset (which spans 130 quarters).
Ruge-Murcia (2012) nds that SMM is already quite accurate when the simulated sample is ve or ten times
longer than the actual data.
46Unlike the other estimated parameters, P and I also a¤ect the steady state of the model. To account
for this, we rely on the following iterative procedure: We rst calibrate the model based on the starting value
for P and I . Upon estimation, but before simulating the model, we recalibrate it for the estimated values of
the habit parameters. This leads only to a very small change in the values of "; ; and sI , while the remaining
parameters are una¤ected.
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and " = 0:03, in line with Liu et al. (2013). Finally, for the credit limit shock, we set the
persistence parameter s = 0:95, while the standard deviation is set to s = 0:04.
We abstain from using an optimal weighting matrix in the estimation. This choice is based
on the ndings of Altonji and Segal (1996), who show that when GMM is used to estimate
covariance structures and, potentially, higher-order moments such as variances, as in our case,
the use of an optimal weighting matrix causes a severe downward bias in estimated parameter
values. Similar concerns apply to SMM as to GMM. The bias arises because the moments
used to t the model itself are correlated with the weighting matrix, and may thus be avoided
by the use of xed weights in the minimization. Altonji and Segal (1996) demonstrate that
minimization schemes with xed weights clearly dominate optimally weighted ones in such
circumstances. Ruge-Murcia (2012) points out that parameter estimates remain consistent
for any positive-denite weighting matrix, and nds that the accuracy and e¢ ciency gains
associated with an optimal weighting matrix are not overwhelming. The empirical moments
and their model counterparts upon estimation are reported in Table F1.
When computing standard errors, we rely on a version of the delta method, as described,
e.g., in Hamilton (1994). We approximate the numerical derivative of the moments with respect
to the estimated parameters using the secant that can be computed by adding and subtracting
 to/from the estimates, where  is a very small number. The covariance (or spectral density)
matrix is estimated using the Newey-West estimator.
Table F1. Empirical and simulated moments
Model simulations U.S. data (1952:I1984:II)
Standard deviations (percent)
Output 2:72 2:84
Consumption 1:87 2:23
Investment 6:52 6:91
House price 4:26 3:05
LTV ratio 6:32 5:68
Skewness
Output  0:14  0:38
Consumption  0:21  0:31
Investment  0:02  0:41
Autocorrelations
Output 0:90 0:82
Consumption 0:85 0:81
Investment 0:94 0:84
House price 0:63 0:79
LTV ratio 0:85 0:94
Correlations with output
Consumption 0:92 0:85
Investment 0:93 0:75
House price 0:73 0:38
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Appendix G. Additional numerical evidence
G1. Impulse responses
Figure G1. Impulse responses to a technology shock
Notes: Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables (in percentage deviation from the steady
state) to a one-standard deviation shock to technology. Left column: sI = 0:67; sE = 0:76; right
column: sI = 0:85; sE = 0:94. The shadowed bands indicate the periods in which the entrepreneurs
are nancially unconstrained.
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Figure G2. Impulse responses to a land demand shock
Notes: Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables (in percentage deviation from the steady
state) to a two-standard deviations shock to land demand. Left column: sI = 0:67; sE = 0:76; right
column: sI = 0:85; sE = 0:94. The shadowed bands indicate the periods in which the entrepreneurs
are nancially unconstrained.
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Figure G3. Impulse responses to a credit limit shock
Notes: Impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables (in percentage deviation from the steady
state) to a one-standard deviation shock to credit limits. Left column: sI = 0:67; sE = 0:76; right
column: sI = 0:85; sE = 0:94. The shadowed bands indicate the periods in which the entrepreneurs
are nancially unconstrained.
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G2 On the occurrence of non-binding collateral constraints
Figure G4. Leverage and non-binding collateral constraints
Notes: Frequency of non-binding constraints for the entrepreneurs (solid-blue line) and the impatient
households (dashed-green line). Both statistics are graphed for di¤erent average LTV ratios faced
by the impatient household. Across all the simulations the entrepreneurial average LTV ratio is
adjusted so as to be 9 basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient households
credit limits, in line with the baseline calibration of the model.
G3. The model with no household debt
In this appendix we report numerical evidence from an alternative model with no role for
collateralized household debt. We e¤ectively exclude impatient households from the model by
setting their income share to a very low number (i.e., 1   = 0:01). All other parameters are
as described in Section 5.1. We then perform the same simulation exercise as that reported
in Section 6.2. The results are reported below.47 As displayed by Figure G5, the alternative
model generates an amount of skewness similar to that of the baseline framework. However, as
illustrated in the left panel of Figure G6, the models ability to reproduce the increase in the
duration of expansions observed in the data is impaired substantially. This can be explained
based on the fact that impatient households contract long-term debt, which induces a certain
smoothness in the consumption/investment proles of all agents in the model. In addition, the
left panel of Figure G7 indicates that the alternative model implies a much larger increase in
output volatility when leverage increases, and a much smaller reversal. This pattern represents
a further challenge to a model with no household borrowing, as it makes our ndings harder
to reconcile with the Great Moderation in output volatility. In fact, attaining such a fall in
volatility would entail a rather large scaling of the structural shocks (recall the analysis in
Section 6.3.1).
47Note that the impatient household is still present in the model, albeit playing a very small role. Thus,
when reporting the results from this model, we choose to keep sI on the horizontal axis, so as to facilitate
comparison with the results in the main text.
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Figure G5. Business cycle asymmetry
Notes: The left panel of the gure reports the skewness of the year-on-year growth rate of output,
consumption and investment, while the right panel displays the ratio between the downside and the
upside semivolatility of year-on-year output growth, for di¤erent average LTV ratios faced by the
nancially constrained agents. To identify the recessionary episodes in the simulated series, we use
the Harding and Pagan (2002) algorithm. Across all the simulations the entrepreneurial average LTV
ratio is adjusted to be 9 basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient households
credit limits, in line with the baseline calibration of the model.
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Figure G7. Leverage and volatility
Notes: The left panel reports the standard deviation of year-on-year output growth, while the right
panel reports the standard deviation of expansions (solid-blue line) and contractions (dashed-green
line) in economic activity. These are determined based on whether output is above or below its
steady-state level. Across all the simulations the entrepreneurial average LTV ratio is adjusted so
as to be 9 basis points greater than any value we consider for impatient householdscredit limits, in
line with the baseline calibration of the model.
G4. Asymmetry and collateral prices
In this appendix we report results obtained by simulating an alternative version of the model
where the collateral assets are pledged at their steady-state prices. We also report results from
our baseline model for comparison.
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G5. Counterfactual exercise
Figure G9. Scaling factor
Notes: Scaling factor applied to the shocks to attain a 40% reduction in the volatility of output
growth over the 1984-1989 time window.
Figure G10. Sequences of LTV ratios
Notes: Sequence of LTV ratios used in each of the two counterfactual scenarios reported in Figure
10. We use the long-term components reported in Figure A1, to which we add a constant in order
to match the calibrated LTV ratios from Section 5.1.1 in 1984. If the resulting LTV ratio exceeds
0:99, we cap it at this value.
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